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IMITATION OR IMPROVEMENT? THE EVOLUTION OF
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA
Ann M. Scarlett*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the evolving global economy, corporations must compete to raise
capital from investors.
Those investors may include individuals, other
corporations, banks, governments, and institutional shareholders such as pension
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds. Numerous factors
impact an investor’s decision to invest money in a particular corporation. For
instance, investors in corporations created within the United States may choose to
invest in a corporation’s shares or bonds depending on their desired level of risk
and rate of return.1 Such investors will also typically invest in a variety of U.S.
corporations, as well as perhaps other investment devices such as commodities, to
diversify the overall risk to their investment portfolios. Another method for
diversification is investing in foreign corporations.
People in the United States have always invested in foreign economies.2
Investment companies actively encourage U.S. investors to invest in a variety of
foreign markets. For instance, E*Trade Financial encourages its customers “to
diversify [their] portfolio by trading currencies and stocks in six global markets—
Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, and the [United Kingdom].”3
Noble Trading offers international stock trading in twenty-six countries’ stock,

*
Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. This article has benefited
immeasurably from comments by participants in a workshop at the Salmon P. Chase
College of Law at Northern Kentucky University. I thank Nicole Oelrich for her excellent
and thorough research assistance.
1. Shares represent an ownership interest, which entitles the owners to a pro rata
share of dividends and to vote for the corporation’s directors as well as certain other
matters. Shares are seen as risky investments because, if the corporation ultimately fails,
the shareholders are entitled to their pro rata share of any assets remaining, if any, after all
other claims have been paid. On the other hand, bonds are long-term debt securities, which
resemble a loan with fixed interest and principal payments over a set number of years.
Bondholders would be repaid their investment before any shareholders in the event the
corporation fails, but they are entitled only to the amount of their investment plus interest
as established by the bond contract. Thus, while shares are riskier investments if the
corporation fails, shareholders can achieve exponential returns if the corporation succeeds.
2. J.J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, in 7 GOVERNMENTS AND
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 51, 51–52 (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1993).
FINANCIAL,
3. Understand
E*Trade
Global
Trading,
E*TRADE
https://us.etrade.com/e/t/estation/pricing?id=1301300000#__highlight (last visited Dec. 31,
2011).
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option, and future exchanges.4 There are even entire companies devoted to
investing in certain international markets. For example, the International Finance
Corporation, a part of the World Bank Group, provides debt and equity financing
for private enterprises in developing countries,5 and its investors represent 182
countries.6 Indeed, in the ever-increasing global economy, investors are now
devoting significant amounts of capital to international markets.7
An investor seeking to invest in a foreign company, however, must
consider numerous factors and risks. In certain countries, the investor must worry
whether the country’s government will nationalize corporations within its borders
or seize corporate assets in some other manner. For example, Zimbabwe
announced that all foreign-owned mining companies must dispose a majority of
their shares to locals by September 25, 2011, pursuant to a controversial
indigenization law.8 Similarly, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry, and its
president has announced plans to nationalize other companies.9
In all countries, the investor fears that the government will impose taxes,
regulations, or reporting requirements that will detrimentally affect the return on
the investment. For example, recent regulatory changes in the United States as
well as its corporate tax rates may cause investors in other countries to hesitate
before investing in U.S. corporations.10 Other country-specific considerations
4. International Stock Trading, NOBLE TRADING, http://www.nobletrading.com/
worldwide.php (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
5. INT’L FUNDING CORP., FUNDING OPERATIONS 3 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/404fda004851d859b815f9fc046daa89/Fact%2Bshee
t_%2Bdiscount%2Bnote%2Bprogram%2B2011.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
6. Id. at 7.
7. P. Krishna Prasanna, Foreign Institutional Investors: Investment Preference in
India, 3 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE 40, 41 (2008) (“In this age of transnational capitalism,
significant amounts of capital are flowing from developed world to emerging economies.”).
See also Todd Moss et al., Why Doesn’t Africa Get More Equity Investment?: Frontier
Stock Markets, Firm Size, and Asset Allocation of Global Emerging Market Funds 1 (Ctr.
for
Global
Dev.,
Working
Paper
No.
112,
2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=981196 (stating that foreign institutional investors’ investments in
emerging markets have risen from $25 billion in 1990 to $300 billion in 2005).
8. Devon Maylie & Farai Mutsaka, Zimbabwe Shuts Out Foreign Minors, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 28, 2011, at A15.
9. Larry B. Pascal, Developments in the Venezuelan Hydrocarbon Sector, 5 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 531, 533 (2009) (noting that Venezuela nationalized its oil industry in
1973); Frank Walsh, Flipping the Act of State Presumption: Protecting America’s
International Investors from Foreign Nationalization Programs, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
369, 371 (2008) (noting that on January 8, 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
announced his plan to nationalize the country’s telephone company and its largest electric
company, which are both partially owned by U.S. companies).
10. See James Gattuso et al., Editorial, Red Tape Rising: Obama’s Torrent of New
Regulation,
WALL ST. J.,
Oct.
29,
2010,
at
A12,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303362404575580551313971136.html
(quoting a Small Business Administration report calculating regulatory costs at $1.75
trillion annually); Martin Vaughan, U.S. Business Faces Burden from New IRS Rules –
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include the stability of the government, the stock market, and the monetary
currency. The investor should also be concerned about the law governing the
corporation’s management, such as whether the country has enacted statutes to
restrain managers from looting the company and to allow investors to hold
managers accountable for their misconduct. Thus, a country’s corporate laws
constitute an important basis by which corporations compete for investors within
the global economy.
This article examines one aspect of corporate law that has recently
changed in many countries: shareholder derivative litigation. It would be
impractical for one article to compare more than a handful of countries’ laws and
practices regarding shareholder derivative litigation.
When considering
investments in foreign countries, numerous methods for categorizing countries
come to mind. Countries could be grouped by their approaches to the law such as
common law, civil law, and socialist law.11 More broadly, countries could be
divided into developed economies (such as the United States, United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia) and emerging economies (such as India and China). Any
categorization of countries is a rough and imperfect divider. Further, in today’s
global economy, a country’s borders do not determine all the relevant concerns for
investors in its business entities because one country’s economic downturn often
affects other countries. For example, the recent debt crisis in Greece has impacted
other countries within the European Union.12 Similarly, the recent housing bubble
and mortgage securitization meltdown in the United States has been felt by much
of the rest of the world.13 This article compares the history and recent
Report,
WALL
ST.
J.,
July
7,
2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703636404575353281768628138.html (discussing concerns expressed
by IRS’s Office of the Taxpayer Advocate about the health care law’s requirement that
businesses report any payments to a vendor that exceeds $600 a year); Richard T. Page, The
International and Comparative Tax War: A Strategic Tax Cut Recommendation for the
Obama Administration, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 290–93 (2009) (noting the United
States has the second highest corporate tax rate in the world). Cf. Maureen Minehan, New
Administration Could Bring New Challenges for Employers, 18 WINTER INT’L HR J. 7, 7
(2009) (“In an already volatile market, businesses should immediately prepare for
impending changes related to wages, immigration, taxes, health care, executive
compensation and benefits, civil rights and . . . an inevitable increase in unionization in the
U.S.”).
11. LARRY CATA BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW: UNITED STATES,
EUROPEAN UNION, CHINA AND JAPAN 1129 (2002).
12. See Simon Nixon, Don’t Bet on an Imminent Euro-Zone Debt Default, WALL ST.
J., April 18, 2011, at C10; see also Editorial, A.I.G., Greece, and Who’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2010, at A26 (noting “Greece has tottered on the brink of fiscal chaos, threatening
to drag much of Europe down with it”); Bond Sale Lifts Greece, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2010,
News, at 26 (noting that Greece faces a “disastrous debt default . . . that has shaken the
European Union”).
13. Mark Landler, Housing Woes in U.S. Spread Around Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2008, at A1 (“The collapse of the housing bubble in the United States is mutating into a
global phenomenon . . . .”); Editorial, Who’s to Blame for Economy?, USA TODAY, Feb. 17,
2008, at 10A (“[T]he Wall Street firms that created bundles of subprime mortgages and
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developments of shareholder derivative litigation within the United States, United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These countries are not only all common law
countries with developed economies, but their legal systems also are all rooted in
English legal traditions.14
Part II of this article explains the basic nature of corporations and
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States, which has the most
recognized and frequent uses of such litigation. Drawing comparisons to the
United States, Part III describes the structure of corporations and the evolution of
shareholder derivative litigation in the United Kingdom, from which the United
States originally imported the derivative device. This article will demonstrate the
very different paths that such litigation has taken in these two countries and
explain the United Kingdom’s recent transition to a statutory shareholder
derivative action that partially resembles the statutes of many U.S. states. Parts IV
and V then discuss shareholder derivative litigation within Canada and Australia,
and demonstrate that these countries have also adopted shareholder derivative
statutes comparable in many respects to those of U.S. states. Reflecting upon this
comparative analysis of shareholder derivative litigation, Part VI evaluates the
criticisms of such litigation in the United States including arguments that it should
be abolished or severely limited. This article concludes by examining the statutes
of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia to determine the influence of U.S.
critics advocating for limitations on derivative actions and to assess any potential
improvements for U.S. shareholder derivative litigation.

II. THE UNITED STATES
Corporations in the United States are created by state law, not federal
law.15 Each of the fifty states has enacted statutes that govern the creation and
operation of the corporations incorporated under its laws. 16 A majority of states
have enacted corporation statutes based on the Model Business Corporations Act
(MBCA),17 which was drafted by a committee of the American Bar Association in

other toxic financial instruments, . . . peddled them as low-risk, high-return investments.
These securities . . . fueled the housing bubble and infected the global financial system.”).
14. The United States, Canada, and Australia are former English colonies, and
England is now part of the United Kingdom.
15. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Corporations are
creatures of state law, and . . . state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2011) (noting that state law creates
corporations as well as determines the rights of shareholders and the powers of directors).
16. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.2, at 5 (2002).
17. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., preface v. (4th 2008); see also Renee M. Jones,
Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1273, 1294 (2009) (“Although Delaware is the leader among states in fashioning the
law and settling disputes on significant corporate matters, the [MBCA] also has a
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1950 and was substantially revised in 1984.18 Although not an adopter of the
MBCA, Delaware is the well-recognized leader in corporate law,19 and courts in
other states often look to it when interpreting their own statutes.20 Despite their
different statutory foundations, the laws of Delaware and states adopting the
MBCA are substantively similar.21
Under statutory law in U.S. states, corporations have a single board of
directors, and directors are elected by the shareholders.22 The directors usually
include both executive officers and independent outside directors.23 Independent
directors must comprise at least half the board of directors for publicly traded
corporations.24 However, even with a majority of independent directors on the
board, critics question directors’ ability to effectively supervise the corporation’s
officers.25
significant influence on the development of corporate law standards throughout the
country.”).
18. See John E. Mulder, Foreward to ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at iii
(1959). The text of the Revised Model Act appears in MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (4th
2008).
19. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, U.
ILL. L. REV. 661, 678 (2008) (“The corporation leader in the United States is now
Delaware.”); see also Jones, supra note 17, at 1287 n.46 (noting that “tiny Delaware [is] the
dominant state in setting corporate law rules”); Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small
Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV.
1129, 1172 (2008) (“Delaware is viewed as a pioneer and perennial leader in the market for
corporate law.”); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal
Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 354 (2009) (noting
Delaware courts’ power to define and alter corporate governance).
20. Jones, supra note 17, at 1294 (noting that courts in other states often “follow
Delaware law as persuasive authority in many decisions under their own statutes and
common law”).
21. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2000) (“[T]here are few substantive
differences between Delaware law and that of other states.”).
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT [MBCA] §§ 7.29, 8.03(c) (2008).
23. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 923 (1999) (defining independent
directors as outside directors without affiliations to the corporation).
24. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008
Financial Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME
FROM 183 (2005) (“Most large corporations already have a majority of disinterested
directors on their boards.”); NASDAQ, INC., STOCK MARKET RULES § 5605(b)(1) (2009)
(requiring that a majority of the board be composed of independent directors); NYSE, INC.,
LISTED
COMPANY
MANUAL
§
303A.01
(2009),
available
at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ (same).
25. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 24, at 184 (“All but two of Enron’s directors were
disinterested, . . . yet the directors simply nodded their heads as [the CEO and CFO] spun
their web of magnificent promises and prophecies.”); Bhagat & Black, supra note 23, at
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Under state statutes, the board of directors possesses the authority to
manage the corporation.26 Because shareholders elect the directors, they
theoretically may hold those directors accountable for their decisions by electing
new directors to the board.27 Other than electing directors, shareholders possess
the power to vote only on dissolution, sales, mergers, and amendments to bylaws
and the articles of incorporation.28 If shareholders believe directors and officers
are acting in their self-interest, mismanaging the corporation, or failing to exercise
proper oversight, often their only recourse, aside from selling their shares, is to
file a shareholder derivative lawsuit.29
Section A discusses the roots of shareholder derivative actions in the
United States and the current state laws governing them. Despite the availability
of shareholder derivative litigation, as Section B explains, U.S. courts typically
defer to directors’ decisions and thus do not impose liability in such actions.
Section C then discusses the fiduciary duties owed by directors pursuant to state
law because such duties form the substantive allegations of most shareholder
derivative actions.

A. U.S. States Recognize Shareholder Derivative Litigation Under Common
Law or Statutes
Courts in the United States have long recognized the shareholder
derivative action, allowing shareholders to bring lawsuits on behalf of the

922 (stating that “[i]ndependent directors often turn out to be lapdogs rather than
watchdogs”); Sharpe, supra note 24, at 109 (“Most corporations have boards where a
majority of directors are outsiders; however, these boards often are composed of
individuals who are not qualified to assess the strategic viability of the corporations they
direct.”).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”);
MBCA § 8.01(b) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of the
board of directors of the corporation, and the business and affairs of the corporation shall
be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors
. . . .”).
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 212(b); MBCA §§ 7.29, 8.03(c).
28. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 105 (2004).
29. See Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 409 (1962) (noting that other than voting rights, the only methods of
shareholder protection are the sale of shares and the derivative lawsuit); Mary Elizabeth
Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 ARK. L. REV. 353, 411 (1999)
(“[I]t should be remembered that when a corporation is wronged and the board refuses to
remedy that wrong, a derivative suit is the shareholder’s only method of redress.”); see also
Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ill. 1988) (“The derivative suit is a device to
protect shareholders against abuses by the corporation, its officers and directors, and is a
vehicle to ensure corporate accountability.”).
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corporation in certain circumstances.30 This form of representative lawsuit was
imported from the English Courts of Chancery.31 Much of the law regarding
shareholder derivative actions was created through common law development by
courts.32 Indeed, all but the procedural aspects of Delaware’s shareholder
derivative law are still governed by common law.33 Most U.S. states have now
statutorily enacted procedures governing shareholder derivative lawsuits, and
many have adopted both the procedures and substantive liability standards of the
MBCA.34 However, even though the MBCA articulates substantive standards of
liability, courts must still apply those standards to the facts of each case just as the
Delaware courts must apply their common law precedents. Because courts in
MBCA states often look to Delaware case law when applying the MBCA’s
liability standards,35 the legal results tend not to differ between these states.36
Shareholders may file a derivative action on behalf of a corporation for
an injury to the corporation,37 a power that is now recognized by statute in the
federal court system and in most states.38 Typical shareholder derivative lawsuits
assert claims for monetary damages based on corporate mismanagement, whereby
30. See Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (using trust law as an
analogy, the court allowed minority shareholders to pursue a derivative lawsuit asserting
that the directors invested the corporation’s money without authority and for personal
reasons); Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831) (using the trust law analogy,
the court permitted a shareholder to sue derivatively in an action claiming the directors took
corporate assets in violation of their fiduciary duty); see also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S.
450, 460 (1881) (stating the requirements for a shareholder to file a derivative action).
31. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 454–57, 460 (discussing the requirements for filing a
shareholder derivative action under English case law and adopting them); see also Nicholas
Calcina Howson, When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms:
The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS
(2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/first-impressions.
32. See Hawes, 104 U.S. at 454–57, 460; see also Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The
Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 980–92
(1957) (discussing the case law history of shareholder derivative actions in England and the
United States); David A. Skeel, The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis, 3–6 (U. of
Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 07-28, 2007) (same).
33. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746–51 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (referencing case law for the standards governing the business judgment rule
defense and directors’ fiduciary duties), aff’d, 906 A.2d 52 (Del. 2006); DEL. CH. CT. R.
23.1 (stating procedural requirements for filing shareholder derivative actions).
34. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 368–69; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., preface at
v. (4th 2008) (listing a majority of states as adopting the MBCA). For the procedural
requirements for shareholder derivative proceedings filed in MBCA states, see MBCA
§§ 7.40–7.46, and for the substantive liability standards, see § 8.31.
35. Jones, supra note 17, at 1294; see also William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of
the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice,
48 BUS. LAW. 351 (1992).
36. See infra Part II.C.
37. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362.
38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (2011); MBCA § 7.40(1).
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the corporation as a whole has suffered harm as a result.39 A shareholder may also
file a direct shareholder lawsuit when the shareholder has suffered an injury in his
or her individual capacity.40 For example, when the majority shareholders have
oppressed or “frozen-out” a minority shareholder, such as by taking all the
corporation’s profits for themselves, the minority shareholder may file a direct
lawsuit.41
A shareholder derivative lawsuit faces significant hurdles and
disincentives. In order to have the standing required to initiate or maintain a
derivative action, federal and state courts require the plaintiff to have been a
shareholder at the time of the challenged transaction.42 In addition, the plaintiff
must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.43 As a separate hurdle, several states’ statutes require shareholders
owning less than a prescribed amount of stock, measured either by shares or
dollars, to post a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the defendants’ reasonable
attorneys’ fees and expenses.44 A bond requirement is a tremendous financial
disincentive to filing derivative actions.
Even in the absence of a bond requirement, a shareholder often has little
financial incentive to initiate derivative litigation because any monetary recovery
belongs to the corporation.45 The shareholder thus benefits only to the extent that
the monetary recovery increases the value of his or her percentage shareholding in
the corporation. Further, no financial incentive likely exists for a shareholder
contemplating a derivative action seeking solely injunctive relief, such as an order
requiring the directors to refrain from certain conduct.46
Perhaps the largest financial hurdle for a shareholder contemplating a
derivative lawsuit is financing the lawsuit. This financial burden, however, can be
alleviated if the shareholder can find an attorney willing to take the representation
on a contingency basis. Contingency fee agreements are permitted in the United
States, unlike most countries.47 U.S. contingency agreements typically state that
39. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 363.
40. Id. § 8.2, at 362–64.
41. See, e.g., Brodie v. Jordan, 847 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006).
42. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a), (b)(1); MBCA § 7.41; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a),
(b) (2009).
43. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a), (b)(1); MBCA § 7.41. Cf. DEL. CH. CT. R.
23.1(a)–(b) (2009) (requiring an affidavit disclaiming any benefit from serving as the
representative of shareholders).
44. WRIGHT ET AL., 7C FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. 2d § 1835 (2006) (listing Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin as states adopting security or bond for expense requirements); see, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 7-107-402(3) (2007) (allowing a court to compel a shareholder who owns less
than a prescribed amount of stock to post a bond); NY BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (same).
45. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362–63.
46. See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361,
381 (2008).
47. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The
Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1999).
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the attorney will receive nothing if the plaintiff loses and that the attorney will
receive as much as 40% of the monetary award if the plaintiff wins or settles.48 If
a shareholder derivative lawsuit settles, which most do,49 the court can approve
payment of a sizeable fee for the plaintiff’s attorney from the settlement fund.50
When the rare derivative lawsuit reaches a final verdict, courts have been quite
willing to award the plaintiff’s attorney his or her fees from the monetary
recovery.51 On the bright side, shareholders who lose their derivative actions must
pay only their own attorneys’ fees pursuant to the so-called American Rule.52
Thus, unlike in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia,53
losing shareholders in the United States do not pay the defendants’ attorneys’

48. Lester Brickman, Anatomy of an Aggregate Settlement: The Triumph of
Temptation Over Ethics, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 700, 706 (2011) (stating that in nonclass
litigation, lawyers typically charge contingency fees ranging from 33% to 40%); Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2045 n.9
(2010) (citing various sources for the proposition that the typical contingency fee is 33% to
40%).
49. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 60 (1991) (finding that about 65% of shareholder derivative lawsuits
settle); see also Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2010) (finding that nearly all shareholder
derivative lawsuits settle); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9 (1985) (noting that a
majority of shareholder derivative lawsuits are resolved through settlement).
50. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c) (“A derivative action may be settled, voluntarily
dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”); Mark J. Loewenstein,
Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25–
26 (1999) (“Whether a shareholder derivative suit presents a valid claim or not, the
plaintiffs’ lawyer may stand to receive a large fee from a settlement, even a settlement that
brings little or no benefit to the corporation.”).
51. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (recognizing
that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees in derivative litigation because allowing “others
to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff’s efforts without contributing equally to the
litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff’s expense”);
Loewenstein, supra note 50, at 2 (“[C]ourts have been willing to award attorneys’ fees to
the plaintiff if the derivative litigation resulted in a ‘substantial or common benefit’ to the
corporation, whether by judgment or settlement.”).
52. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975);
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007).
53. Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part
Two: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal
Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 14 (2008)
(stating that Canada follows the English “loser pays” rule); S. Stuart Clark, Thinking
Locally, Suing Globally: The International Frontiers of Mass Tort Litigation in Australia,
74 DEF. COUNS. J. 139, 148 (2007) (stating that Australia follows the English rule of loser
pays); see also Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability Across
Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1406, 1434 (2006) (discussing the U.K.’s loser pays
rules).
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fees.54 If the shareholders’ attorney was hired on a contingency fee basis, then the
shareholders owe nothing to their own attorney.
The demand requirement is another significant procedural hurdle of
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States. In federal court and most
state courts, a shareholder may file a derivative action only after making demand
on the board to rectify the challenged transaction.55 Indeed, the MBCA’s
universal demand requirement cannot be avoided.56 The demand requirement is
justified on the basis that the board of directors typically controls the corporation’s
litigation because it possesses the statutory authority to manage the corporation
and its assets, including any cause of action belonging to the corporation.57 The
board may respond to the shareholder’s demand by filing the lawsuit itself,
resolving the matter internally, or rejecting the demand.58 The typical board
response is to reject the demand,59 which then requires the shareholder to
demonstrate to the court that the demand was wrongfully rejected before a
derivative action may proceed.60 In some states, the shareholder can forgo making
demand by pleading that it is excused, which requires a showing that the demand
would be futile.61
To establish that the demand is futile or that the demand was wrongfully
rejected by the board, the plaintiff must show that the business judgment rule
defense does not apply to the board’s decision.62 As more fully explained below,
this defense presumes that directors acted consistently with their fiduciary duties

54. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247; Franklin Gevurtz, Disney in a Comparative
Light, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 453, 488 (2007).
55. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; MBCA § 7.42.
56. MBCA § 7.42 (“No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and 90 days
have expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been
notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to
the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.”).
57. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MBCA § 8.01(b).
58. See Lisa Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005).
59. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 395; see also Fairfax, supra note 58, at 408
(noting that “most boards” decide “not to bring any action”).
60. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Del. 1996); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16,
at 395.
61. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814–15 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000). Cf. MBCA § 7.42 (2008)
(stating a universal demand requirement).
62. Beneville v. York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1;
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 395. Courts often state that plaintiffs already sufficient tools
for gathering evidence without discovery. See, e.g., Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 n.11
(describing shareholders’ access to public sources and right to inspect corporate records);
see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (shareholder’s inspection right); MBCA § 16.02
(same).
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of care, loyalty, and good faith.63 To rebut this presumption in the demand
context, the shareholder typically must prove that a majority of directors were
financially interested in the challenged decision or were not independent in
making that decision.64 In other words, a trial court will permit a shareholder
derivative lawsuit to proceed only when the board of directors is disabled by some
conflict of interest. In such circumstances, the judge may presume the directors
would not choose to sue themselves despite the existence of meritorious claims.
Courts frequently find that the business judgment rule protects directors’ rejection
of a demand request.65
Even if a shareholder derivative action survives a motion to dismiss
based on the demand requirement, the corporation’s directors may attempt to stop
the litigation through a special litigation committee.66 The board may appoint a
special litigation committee that is composed of independent and disinterested
directors.67 After investigation and consultation with experts, the special litigation
committee may seek to terminate the shareholder’s action (through a motion to
dismiss or motion for summary judgment) based on its recommendation that
continuing the litigation is not in the best interests of the corporation.68 Most
courts find that the business judgment rule defense protects the committee’s
recommendation69 and therefore grant the motion to dismiss.70
63. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–
17 (Del. 2000).
64. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814–15 (Del. 1984); see also Beneville, 769 A.2d at 85
n.9. For the MBCA provisions for showing demand was wrongfully rejected, see MBCA
§ 7.44(c).
65. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 408 (noting that courts defer to directors’ rejection of a
demand request).
66. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – the Business Judgment Rule,
36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 647–48 (2002).
67. Id. at 648.
68. Id.; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 279 (1985) (noting that a special litigation committee (SLC) may
believe dismissal is in the corporation’s best interest, because it may raise the stock price).
69. In some states, the plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the business judgment
rule presumption with respect to the SLC’s decision, and judicial inquiry is limited to the
disinterestedness and independence of the SLC members and the adequacy of their
investigation. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001–02 (N.Y. 1979);
Finley v. Super. Ct., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Cutshall v. Barker,
733 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876,
889–90 (Minn. 2003). Other states also give business judgment rule protection to a SLC’s
recommendation but put the burden of proof on the defendants. See, e.g., Lewis v. Boyd,
838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). In Delaware, the defendant also bears the
burden of proving the independence and good faith of the SLC, but the court may apply its
own business judgment in deciding whether to dismiss. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 787–89 (Del. 1981).
70. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 409 (noting that “in the vast majority of cases courts
grant the motion based on the [SLC’s] recommendation”) (citing Carol B. Swanson,
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B. U.S. States Judicially or Statutorily Defer to Directors’ Business Judgment
Assuming plaintiffs survive these initial motions to dismiss, the directors
can again assert the business judgment rule defense in a motion for summary
judgment or at trial.71 The business judgment rule defense was created by
common law, and U.S. courts have recognized the defense for almost 200 years.72
A frequently stated rationale for the business judgment rule defense is that it
provides the protection directors need to fulfill their responsibility to manage the
corporation without fear of shareholders second-guessing their decisions through
derivative lawsuits.73 Thus, the rule allows directors to take calculated business
risks74 by protecting them from liability “for honest mistakes of judgment or
unpopular business decisions.”75 Other justifications include that directors are
“better-suited than courts to make business decisions” and that “judges are not
business experts.”76
The Delaware Supreme Court articulates the business judgment rule
defense as a presumption that directors have acted consistently with their fiduciary
duties in making decisions for the corporation.77 To rebut that presumption,
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the
Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1356–57 (1993)).
71. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
72. S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93,
93 (1979–1980).
73. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003);
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01
cmt. d (1994).
74. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 110; see also Branson, supra note 66, at 637
(stating the business judgment rule is necessary to encourage directors to engage in
“informed risk taking that is essential to business success”); Len Costa, Boss of the Bosses:
Delaware’s Most Important Judge Takes on Greedy Executives, Congress, and the History
of Corporate Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2005, at 43, 46 (stating that Delaware courts
do not “second-guess decisions made by informed, disinterested boards, for fear of chilling
commerce and innovation”).
75. Arsht, supra note 72, at 96; see also Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 113–14
(“Business decisions . . . typically involve prudential judgments among a number of
plausible alternatives. Given the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully made
choices among such alternatives may turn out badly.”).
76. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Branson, supra
note 66, at 637 (stating that “courts are ill-equipped to review business decisions” because
they “often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises as to business matters such as
competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic and industry trends”). This judicial
deference for business decisions is difficult to justify when courts will review decisions of
physicians and engineers. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 120; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991).
77. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
To invoke the business judgment rule defense, the board must make a decision, which
includes a decision to act or a conscious decision not to act. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
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plaintiffs must show a breach of fiduciary duty78 or demonstrate fraud, illegality,
or waste.79 If the plaintiff cannot rebut the presumption, the business judgment
rule defense protects the directors from liability for their decision.80 On the other
hand, if the plaintiff can rebut the presumption, the directors must prove that the
challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.81
The MBCA also contains the principal elements of the Delaware
business judgment rule defense, although it does not codify it as a whole.82
MBCA section 8.31 sets forth the standards of liability for directors. Similar to
the Delaware business judgment rule defense, the MBCA begins with a
presumption that a director is not liable “for any decision to take or not to take
action, or any failure to take any action.”83 The MBCA then states that a plaintiff
may rebut that presumption by showing that the director breached the fiduciary
duties of good faith, care, or loyalty.84 Only the duty of loyalty portion of the
MBCA regarding a director’s independence, however, shifts the burden of proof
to the director.85 Even then the director must show only that the “challenged
conduct was reasonably believed by the director to be in the best interests of the
corporation,” not that the transaction was fair to the corporation as required by
Delaware law.86
Thus, like Delaware’s business judgment rule defense, the MBCA starts
with a presumption against liability that the plaintiff must rebut by showing that
the director breached a fiduciary duty. Regardless of whether a state follows the
MBCA or the common law formulation of the business judgment rule defense,

805, 813 (Del. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000).
78. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–
17 (Del. 2000) (stating that to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, the
shareholder must “provide evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its
challenged decision, breached any one of its ‘triad of fiduciary duties’”).
79. See, e.g., Paglin v. Saztec Int’l, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993)
(illegality and fraud); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)
(fraud); In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 73–74 (waste); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327,
335–36 (Del. Ch. 1997) (same; defining waste as “a transfer of corporate assets that serves
no corporate purpose” or “for which no consideration at all is received”).
80. McMullin, 765 A.2d at 916–17; Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.,
569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
81. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001); see also In re Walt
Disney, 906 A.2d at 52.
82. MBCA § 8.31 cmt. (noting that the MBCA “does not codify the business
judgment rule as a whole” but that “its principal elements . . . are embedded in”
§ 8.31(a)(2)).
83. Id. § 8.31(a).
84. Id. § 8.31(a)(2); see infra Part II.C.
85. See id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B).
86. Compare id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B), with In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52.
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judges invoke the defense to protect boards of directors from legal liability in the
vast majority of shareholder derivative actions.87

C. U.S. States Impose Fiduciary Duties on Directors Through Common Law
or Statutes
In the United States, directors are often said to owe a triad of fiduciary
duties: a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of good faith.88 In Delaware,
directors’ fiduciary duties were created by the courts and are still embodied solely
within the common law.89 In states adopting the MBCA, these fiduciary duties are
imposed by statute.90 As demonstrated below, Delaware common law and the
MBCA formulate the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith using
different language, but they share many similarities. Although directors
theoretically face personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duties under both
Delaware common law and the MBCA, directors’ financial liability for breaching
their fiduciary obligations is effectively eliminated through the combined use of
indemnification agreements and insurance.91

87. See Fairfax, supra note 58, at 409 (arguing that “the tremendous deference courts
grant to board decisions means that courts hold directors liable for only the most egregious
examples of director misconduct”); see also TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY:
AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD 183–84 (2006) (noting “the historical
strong protection of corporate boards”); Coffee, supra note 49, at 9 (noting that the rare
shareholder derivative lawsuits in which judges reach the merits are overwhelmingly
decided in the defendant’s favor).
88. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916–17 (Del. 2000); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
89. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 746–48, 749–51 (referencing case law
for the standards governing directors’ fiduciary duties); Jennifer O’Hare, Director
Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure
and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Law, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 510
(2002) (“The common law of fiduciary duty is the primary means used to ensure that
directors of a state-created entity are acting with ‘due care, good faith, and loyalty.’”).
90. MBCA §§ 8.30–8.31.
91. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 412; Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 784 (2011) (noting that “directors are shielded from personal
liability”); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1055,
1070–74 (2006) (noting that in a comprehensive study of outside director liability, only
thirteen cases imposed personal liability on directors of public companies in the course of
twenty-five years of Securities Exchange Commission enforcement actions, securities class
action lawsuits, and shareholder derivative lawsuits; only three of the thirteen cases
involved fiduciary duty breaches); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A
Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 246 (2011)
(noting that directors avoid personal liability, while corporations must pay the costs of
litigation, settlements, and insurance).
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1. The Fiduciary Duty of Care
Delaware courts have stated that the duty of care requires directors to
“use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in
similar circumstances.”92 In analyzing alleged duty of care breaches, however,
Delaware courts focus only on procedural due care, meaning they review alleged
duty of care breaches based on the process by which the board made its decision
and not the decision’s merits.93 Directors thus breach their duty of care by failing
“to act in an informed and deliberate manner” when they make decisions on
behalf of their corporation.94 The effect of this process-oriented focus is that
courts “insulate directors from liability whenever they make even a modest
attempt to follow the appropriate formalities.”95
Delaware courts further minimize the duty of care by requiring that
“deficiencies in the directors’ process are actionable only if the directors’ actions
are grossly negligent.”96 Gross negligence is defined as a “‘reckless indifference
to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders’ or actions which
are ‘without the bounds of reason.’”97 The combined effect of the focus on
procedural due care and the gross negligence standard is that Delaware courts
rarely hold directors liable for breaching their duty of care.98
92. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 749; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (stating,
“[D]irectors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all
material information reasonably available to them”); see also Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S.
132, 147 (1891) (stating that directors have a duty to “supervise the business with
attention”).
93. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874–88 (Del. 1985); see also In re
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)(“[W]hether a
judge . . . believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through
‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no ground for director liability, so long as
the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good
faith effort to advance corporate interests.”).
94. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873.
95. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1790 (2001); Branson, supra note
66, at 639–40 (“[C]ritics of the modern business judgment rule say that insistence on
formal decisions places a premium on play acting and on paper trails. It does not improve
the quality of decisions that are made.”).
96. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 749.
97. Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12
(Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990) (quoting Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch.
1929)).
98. In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 750 (“[D]uty of care violations are rarely found”);
J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of
Liability Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 298 (2009)
(“Delaware courts simply did not find violations of the duty of care. Directors confronted
little or no risk of liability for ordinary business decisions. Only suits alleging conflicts of
interest had any realistic hope of success.”). Cf. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s
Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business
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The rare example is Smith v. Van Gorkom, in which the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the directors violated the duty of care by not adequately
investigating a merger offer.99 In Van Gorkom, the court held that the business
judgment rule defense does not protect an uninformed decision and that directors
may be held to have breached the duty of care if the plaintiff shows that they were
grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves of all material and reasonably
available information.100 The impact of Van Gorkom was minimized by the
Delaware Legislature’s subsequent enactment of section 102(b)(7), which permits
corporations to limit or entirely eliminate directors’ monetary liability for duty of
care breaches.101 All states have now enacted statutes allowing corporations to
limit or eliminate directors’ liability for duty of care breaches.102
In Delaware, directors’ duty of care also traditionally included an
obligation to oversee the corporation,103 and courts could impose liability for “a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight.”104 For
example, in the seminal case of In re Caremark International Derivative
Litigation, the plaintiffs asserted that the board of directors breached its fiduciary
duty of care by failing to monitor the conduct of its employees for compliance
with federal law.105 The plaintiffs claimed that this oversight failure led to a
government investigation and federal indictment for multiple felonies against
Caremark, as well as Caremark subsequently paying civil and criminal fines
totaling $250 million.106 The court stated that directors are responsible for
ensuring “that information and reporting systems exist . . . that are reasonably
designed to provide . . . accurate information sufficient to allow . . . informed
judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business
performance.”107 In 2006, however, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to have

Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 nn.1–2 (1983) (noting only seven cases holding
directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty other than self-interested transactions).
99. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
100. Id. at 872.
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2008); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 1995) (noting that § 102(b)(7) was enacted in response to
Van Gorkom); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU
L. REV. 353, 369 (2004) (Van Gorkom “motivated the Delaware legislature . . . to enact
legislation that allowed Delaware corporations to exempt directors from monetary damages
for breaches of the duty of care.”).
102. Fairfax, supra note 58, at 412; Brown & Gopalan, supra note 98, at 288 (noting
that all states allow companies to eliminate monetary damages for breach of the duty of
care); id. at 310 (describing the different provisions adopted by states).
103. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); see also In
re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
104. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
105. Id. at 964.
106. Id. at 960–61.
107. Id. at 970.
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reclassified oversight claims as a breach of the duty of loyalty.108 In Stone v.
Ritter,109 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that a showing of bad-faith conduct
“is essential to establish director oversight liability” and then held that “the
fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.”110 Thus, Delaware
still recognizes oversight claims as a breach of fiduciary duty, but that fiduciary
duty is now loyalty rather than care.111
Similar to Delaware common law, the MBCA’s standards of conduct
state that directors “shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like
position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”112
Like Delaware courts, the MBCA also focuses on the process a director used in
making a decision, rather than the merits of the decision; it does so by examining
whether the director was reasonably informed.113 However, the MBCA imposes
liability only if the plaintiff proves that the director “did not reasonably believe”
the challenged decision was in the corporation’s best interests or “was not
informed to an extent the director reasonably believed appropriate in the
circumstances.”114 The MBCA thus focuses on what the particular director
reasonably believed, rather than what a reasonable person in the director’s
position would believe. The wording of this MBCA provision seems intended to
insulate directors from liability.
This intent to insulate directors from liability for alleged duty of care
breaches is affirmed by the different language chosen to describe the standard for
a duty of care claim alleging lack of oversight. For an oversight claim, the MBCA
adopted the reasonable director standard by requiring the plaintiff to establish that:
[T]he challenged conduct consisted or was the result of . . . a
sustained failure of the director to devote attention to ongoing
oversight of the business and affairs of the corporation, or a
failure to devote timely attention, by making (or causing to be
made) appropriate inquiry, when particular facts and
circumstances of significant concern materialize that would alert
a reasonably attentive director to the need therefor . . . .115
The MBCA’s use of “a reasonably attentive director” standard for oversight
claims contrasts with its focus on the particular director’s belief in customary duty
108. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006); Martin Petrin, Assessing
Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 433, 444–47 (2011).
109. Stone, 911 A.2d at 362.
110. Id. at 370.
111. But see Petrin, supra note 108, at 447–50 (noting that Stone v. Ritter created
many doctrinal uncertainties that have not yet been resolved).
112. MBCA § 8.30(b).
113. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B).
114. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(ii).
115. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iv).
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of care cases and supports the proposition that directors are likely insulated from
liability for an alleged breach of the duty of care.
Therefore, the MBCA’s emphasis on the challenged director’s beliefs
likely produces the same effective result as Delaware law: no liability imposed on
directors for alleged breaches of the duty of care. However, the MBCA utilizes a
different path to do so. It avoids the confusing gross negligence standard of
Delaware law, but uses a potentially malleable standard that asks what the
challenged director reasonably believed. The similarity in effect between
Delaware law and the MBCA is also evidenced by the rarity of courts finding a
breach of the duty of care.116

2. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
Delaware courts broadly state the duty of loyalty as “mandat[ing] that the
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders take[] precedence over any
interest possessed by a director . . . and not shared by the stockholders
generally.”117 In determining whether directors have breached their duty of
loyalty, Delaware courts examine whether the directors made decisions
independently based on the merits of the transaction and whether the directors
were disinterested in the transaction’s outcome.118
According to Delaware law, directors are “interested” in the outcome of a
transaction when they will receive a personal benefit from it that is not equally
shared by the shareholders.119 Such benefit includes any “substantial benefit from
supporting a transaction” and thus need not be monetary.120 Examples of
interestedness include self-dealing, insider trading, payment of excessive
compensation, usurpation of corporate opportunities, and competition with the
corporation.121

116. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. 2006)
(“[D]uty of care violations are rarely found.”); Fairfax, supra note 58, at 407–08 (“Over the
last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of legal
liability for directors who breach their duty of care under state law.”). Cf. Cohn, supra note
98, at 591 nn.1–2 (noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of
fiduciary duty other than self-interested transactions).
117. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
118. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362; see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22
(Del. Ch. 2002) (stating that the business judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the
directors either were “interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the
independence to consider objectively whether the transaction was in the best interest of its
company and all of its shareholders”).
119. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993).
120. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362.
121. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 306–07, 321–23.
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Independence requires that directors base their decisions “entirely on the
corporate merits of the transaction” and not on personal considerations.122
Delaware’s common law definition of “independence” focuses primarily on
family relationships,123 meaning courts assume that a director cannot act
independently if a family member stands on the other side of the proposed
corporate transaction. A director also is not independent if he or she is
“controlled” by an interested director who has the “unilateral power to decide
whether the director continues to receive a benefit upon which the director is so
dependent or is of such subjective material importance that its threatened loss”
creates doubt as to whether the director can objectively consider the corporate
merits of the transaction.124 Delaware courts, however, rarely find one director to
be controlled by another125 and have never found nonfamilial relationships to be
bias producing.126 As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, “Allegations of
mere personal friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone,
are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”127

122. Id.; see also Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002)
(“Directors must not only be independent, but must act independently.”); Rales v.
Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 935 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he board must be able to act free of personal
financial interest and improper extraneous influences.”).
123. Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264–65.
124. Id. at 264; see also Beam ex rel. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004);
Rales, 634 A.2d at 936.
125. Branson, supra note 66, at 640 (“Courts are loathe to find that an otherwise
reputable business person is not his or her own person.”); see also Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052
(“To create a reasonable doubt about an outside director’s independence, a plaintiff must
plead facts that would support the inference that because of the nature of a relationship or
additional circumstances other than the interested director’s stock ownership or voting
power, the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than
risk the relationship with the interested director.”).
126. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1040.
127. See id.; see also Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980–81
(Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that an allegation that a director was controlled by another director
based on their fifteen-year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt as to independence). Scholars have criticized Delaware’s definition of
director independence and proposed alternative approaches. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer,
Director Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race, Gender, Class, and the Disney-Ovitz
Litigation, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1011, 1023 (2005) (suggesting an alternative approach to
assessing director independence that focuses on subordination, including all hierarchical
and affective relationships between people, and would defeat any claim of independence);
J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 55–56 (2006–2007) (arguing that
“Delaware courts do not adequately ensure that directors defined as independent are in fact
independent” and suggesting changes “to ensure that limits on disloyalty remain in place
and that fairness continues to matter”); Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of
Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 293–94 (2009) (analyzing biases that
directors can neither identify nor control, such as biases in favor of one’s friends, and
evaluating potential responses to these unconscious biases).
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Similar to Delaware common law, but using slightly different language,
the MBCA imposes liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty when the plaintiff
establishes that the director was not independent. Under the MBCA, the plaintiff
must establish “a lack of objectivity due to the director’s familial, financial or
business relationship with . . . another person having a material interest in the
challenged conduct” or the director lacked “independence due to the director’s
domination or control by” such a person.128 Further, the plaintiff must establish
that such relationship or domination “could reasonably be expected to have
affected the director’s judgment respecting the challenged conduct in a manner
adverse to the corporation.”129 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a
reasonable expectation that the relationship or domination affected the director’s
judgment, then the director bears the burden of proving “that the challenged
conduct was reasonably believed by the director to be in the best interests of the
corporation.”130 This burden shifting is similar to Delaware law, which requires
such a director to prove that the challenged transaction was entirely fair to the
corporation.131 Although the MBCA’s express inclusion of financial or business
relationships affecting objectivity is a departure from Delaware law’s focus on
familial relationships, no court opinion has yet applied the MBCA definition to
find a director is not independent on the basis of such a relationship.
The MBCA also has numerous provisions requiring a director to be
disinterested. For instance, the MBCA states that a director may be held liable
when the plaintiff establishes that the director received “financial benefit to which
the director was not entitled” or failed “to deal fairly with the corporation and its
shareholders.”132 The MBCA specifically defines when a director has a
conflicting interest in a corporate transaction and the conditions for when the
directors or the shareholders may ratify such transactions.133 It also has a separate
provision that prohibits directors from usurping the corporation’s business
opportunities.134 Thus, these provisions largely track Delaware law regarding
disinterestedness. In addition to the MBCA, the rules adopted by the NYSE and
NASDAQ pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 largely follow Delaware
law in defining when directors of publicly traded corporations are not independent
and disinterested.135

128. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(iii).
129. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(A).
130. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iii)(B).
131. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90–91 (Del. 2001); In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006).
132. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(v).
133. Id. §§ 8.60–8.63.
134. Id. § 8.70.
135. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m) (2008); NYSE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/
(stating that a director is not independent if, among other things, the director has a material
relationship with the listed company, has been an employee of the listed company within
the last three years, or has an immediate family member who has been an executive officer
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3. The Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith
The duty of good faith is the weakest of the three fiduciary duties.
Although the term “good faith” appears in early shareholder derivative cases, it
has never served as a basis for any reported court decision finding directors
breached a fiduciary duty.136 In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of the duty of good faith by identifying two categories of bad faith
fiduciary conduct: 1) “subjective bad faith,” meaning “fiduciary conduct
motivated by an actual intent to do harm,”137 and 2) “intentional dereliction of
duty [or] a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.”138 The Delaware
Supreme Court again addressed the duty of good faith a year later in a case
alleging that the directors failed to exercise proper oversight.139 In Stone v. Ritter,
the court stated that an oversight claim invokes the second category of bad faith
conduct, but held “the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of
loyalty.”140 Consistent with this interpretation, the court explained that “a failure
to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition
of fiduciary liability” but that a “failure to act in good faith may result in liability
because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element’ . . . ‘of the
fundamental duty of loyalty.’”141 It concluded by stating that the duty of “good
faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same
footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”142 Thus, although Delaware recognizes
a duty of good faith, it is now subsumed within the duty of loyalty.
Although Delaware common law does not recognize the duty of good
faith as an independent fiduciary duty, the MBCA may. The MBCA states that
liability may be imposed on directors for “action not in good faith.”143 However,
the MBCA provides no definition of good faith or bad faith conduct, and its duty
of good faith has not been tested through litigation.

of the listed company within the last three years); NASDAQ MARKETPLACE RULE
4200(a)(15) (2004) (similar definition).
136. See Arsht, supra note 72, at 99.
137. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63–64 (Del. 2006).
138. Id. at 66–67 (describing this second category as proscribing fiduciary conduct
that does not involve disloyalty but yet is more culpable than gross negligence).
139. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–66 (Del. 2006) (alleging that the directors of
AmSouth Bancorporation failed to ensure that a reasonable compliance system existed for
the corporation and its subsidiary bank, because both entities had to pay millions of dollars
in fines and civil penalties to resolve government investigations into the bank’s failure to
file federally required Suspicious Activity Reports).
140. Id. at 369–70.
141. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
142. Id. at 370.
143. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(iii) (“A director shall not be liable to the corporation or its
shareholders . . . unless the party asserting liability in a proceeding establishes that . . . the
challenged conduct consisted or was the result of . . . action not in good faith . . . .”).
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III. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom encompasses four countries: England, Wales,
Scotland, and Northern Ireland.144 Although the United Kingdom is part of the
European Union, the European Union has yet to pass any legislation specifically
tailored for shareholder derivative lawsuits or fiduciary duties. Thus, the laws of
the United Kingdom still govern its corporations and shareholder derivative
litigation.
Corporate laws in the United Kingdom were originally created through
common law development by the courts of England.145 England’s first
codification of its corporate law occurred in 1862146 and was supplemented by
common law decisions.147 In 2006, the United Kingdom completely revised its
corporate law and adopted the Companies Act of 2006.148 The current Companies
Act is the longest statute in the British Parliament’s history at over 700 pages149
and was implemented in sections over the course of two years.150 The U.K.
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform explained the
rationale for the overhaul:
The United Kingdom was one of the first nations to establish
rules for the operation of companies. Today our system of
company law and corporate governance, setting out the legal
basis on which companies are formed and run, is a vital part of
the legal framework within which business is conducted. As the
business environment evolves, there is a risk that the legal
framework can become gradually divorced from the needs of
companies, in particular the needs of smaller private businesses,
creating obstacles to ways that companies want and need to
operate.151
144. Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1:
Substantive Grounds for Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2007 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 614, 641.
145. Katharine Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country
Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 791, 798 (2002); Black et al., supra note 144, at
641; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 467–84 (1827).
146. Pistor et al., supra note 145, at 798 (citing Companies Act, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89
(1862) (Eng.)).
147. Black et al., supra note 144, at 641.
148. Explanatory Note, Background to Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.), ¶ 3,
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes/division/2.
149. Id.; Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of
the United Kingdom’s “Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,” 29 SYDNEY L. REV.
577, 589 (2007) (“The legislation is the longest in UK parliamentary history.”).
150. See Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, Explanatory
Notes, Background ¶ 3, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/notes/
division/2.
151. Id.
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The Companies Act covers all aspects of corporate law, including formation of
companies, rights of shareholders (called “members” in U.K. companies),
appointment and duties of directors, derivative actions, audit requirements, and
almost every other element of corporate law that one can imagine.152 The prior
Companies Act included provisions giving minority shareholders a limited ability
to bring lawsuits for “unfair prejudice,”153 which is similar to direct suits for
oppression in the United States. However, it was the Companies Act of 2006 that
first recognized shareholder derivative lawsuits154 and first codified the directors’
fiduciary duties that had been developed at common law.155
In many respects, U.K. companies are similar to U.S. corporations. U.K.
companies have a single board, and shareholders appoint directors to the board.156
The board then chooses the managers, and the CEO is usually a key figure on the
board.157 Although the Companies Act contains very few provisions concerning
board structure,158 the regulations governing publicly listed companies provide
standards for companies to use in creating their boards of directors.159 One such
standard requires that half the board be independent nonexecutives, also called
outside directors.160
Notwithstanding these similarities, there are key distinctions between
U.S. corporations and U.K. companies. For example, U.S. corporations are
created and governed by state law, rather than federal law.161 Companies in the
United Kingdom are controlled by federal laws, including the Companies Act. In
addition, the Companies Act does not expressly confer managerial power on the
board in the same way that statutes of U.S. states do. Under the Companies Act, a
company’s constitution (or articles of association) specifies the directors’

152. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.).
153. Companies Act, 1985, c. 46, § 461(2)(c) (U.K.); see also XIAONING LI, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SHAREHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE ACTIONS 19 (2007).
154. See infra Part III.A.
155. Black et al., supra note 144, at 661.
156. Rita Esen, Internal Control Within the Legal Structure of United Kingdom and
German Companies: Prospects for Change, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 91, 94 (2001); Cheffins &
Black, supra note 53, at 1400.
157. Esen, supra note 156, at 94.
158. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 154–56 (requiring private companies to have at
least one director and public companies to have at least two directors). Cf. Klaus J. Hopt &
Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe – Recent Development of Internal Corporate
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 ECFR 135,
149 (2004) (discussing the lack of detailed provisions on board structure in the 1985
Companies Act).
159. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2010),
available at http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/Corporate_Governance/UK
%20Corp% 20Gov%20Code%20June%202010.pdf. For discussion of such provisions, see
Hopt & Leyens, supra note 158, at 149.
160. See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 159, § A.3.2; Cheffins & Black,
supra note 53, at 1400; Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 31.
161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MBCA § 8.01(b).
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authority,162 and directors have a statutory duty to “act in accordance with the
company’s constitution.”163 In practice, company constitutions usually grant
unlimited management authority to the directors, and unlimited authority is the
default provision under the Companies Act.164
The United Kingdom also has a Corporate Governance Code for every
publicly listed company that “sets out standards of good practice in relation to
board leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations
with shareholders.”165 The original code in 2000 was an initiative of the private
sector, and it was incorporated into the U.K. Listing Rules.166 Subsequent
revisions are the product of the Financial Reporting Council, a private
organization funded by the United Kingdom’s accounting and legal professions,
financial and commerce communities, and government.167 Enforcement of the
Corporate Governance Code is the responsibility of the United Kingdom Listing
Authority, which is a government agency charged with regulating the London
Stock Exchange.168 The Listing Authority sets the Listing Rules, which a
company, as a matter of contract and statutory law, must abide by in order to be
traded on the London Stock Exchange.169 In these respects, the U.K. Listing
Authority is similar to the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).170 The
Listing Rules require that a listed company either comply or explain why it does
not comply with the Corporate Governance Code.171 Although both the creation
and enforcement of the Corporate Governance Code are “complex mixtures of
private and public action” in the United Kingdom, the trend is toward greater
government involvement.172
Section A explains the United Kingdom’s traditionally limited
recognition of shareholder derivative actions under common law and its 2006
expansion of such actions in the Companies Act. It demonstrates the similarities
162. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, pt. 3, § 31. A company’s constitution includes its
articles of association, which must be registered with the registrar of companies. Id. §§ 17,
9(6).
163. Id. pt. 10, § 171.
164. Black et al., supra note 144, at 643.
165. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 159.
166. Richard C. Nolan, The Legal Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the
United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors Following the Higgs Report, 6 THEORETICAL
INQUIRES L. 413, 417 (2005).
167. Id. at 417–18. See information about the Financial Reporting Council at
http://www.frc.org.uk/about/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
168. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418; John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The
Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 239 n.20 (2007).
169. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418.
170. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2012); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2012).
171. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418; Tihir Sarkar et al., An Analysis of the Walker
Review of Corporate Governance in U.K. Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 127
BANKING L.J. 242, 249 n.4 (2010).
172. Nolan, supra note 166, at 418; Sarkar et al., supra note 171, at 249 n.4.
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between the Companies Act and provisions of state law in the United States.
Section B then discusses the United Kingdom’s lack of a business judgment rule
defense similar to that recognized by U.S. states. Finally, Section C examines the
fiduciary duties owed by directors at common law and under the current
Companies Act.

A. The United Kingdom Recognized Shareholder Derivative Actions at
Common Law and Now by Statute
Although both the United States and England recognized a shareholder
derivative action at common law, English common law restricted such actions to
very narrow circumstances. Under English common law, shareholder derivative
actions were permitted as a limited exception to the basic proper plaintiff rule.173
Under the proper plaintiff rule, the company was the proper party to bring a
lawsuit for director misconduct because directors owed duties to the company
alone.174 However, because the board decided when a company would sue,175 it
was not likely to bring a lawsuit against directors, although occasionally new
directors would bring proceedings when the former directors departed.176
Common law did permit a shareholder to bring a direct action for a personal
injury, but the relief could not include any diminution in value resulting from the
company’s losses.177
Recognizing these likely obstacles to remedying corporate wrongdoing,
courts used their equity power to create a limited exception to the proper plaintiff
rule that permitted a shareholder to bring a suit on behalf of the company.178
Shareholder derivative actions were permitted only for acts not ratifiable by a
simple majority of shareholders, such as where the alleged conduct was illegal,
ultra vires, fraudulent, or in breach of a special majority requirement.179 In other
words, this majority rule principle meant that an English court would not
intervene in routine business matters unless the plaintiff established that the action
involved nonratifiable conduct.
Further, under English common law, a
shareholder could initiate a suit only when she owned enough shares to dictate
173. LI, supra note 153, at 19–22 (citing Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 2
Hare 461).
174. Id.
175. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404 (citing Mitchell & Hobbs (UK) Ltd v.
Mill, (1996) 2 B.C.L.C. 102 (Q.B.); Breckland Group Holdings Ltd. v. London & Suffolk
Props. Ltd., [1989] B.C.L.C. 100 (Ch.)).
176. Id. (discussing the Equitable Life case, in which, after the company became
insolvent and the directors were accused of wrongful trading, the post-crisis board initiated
proceedings against the directors allegedly responsible for the debt).
177. LI, supra note 153, at 19–22.
178. Id.; Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404.
179. LI, supra note 153, at 19–22; see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404
(stating that the exceptions included fraud on the minority shareholders, ultra vires conduct,
and acts requiring a vote by a special majority of the shareholders).
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voting outcomes180 and only after the board declined to sue.181 This latter
requirement is similar to the demand requirement in U.S. states.182 In addition, the
English majority rule principle is similar to the U.S. business judgment rule
defense because both start with a presumption against review of directors’
decisions. It is also similar in that both operate as a substantive restriction on
shareholder derivative actions and a procedural standing restriction.
Under English common law, minority shareholders had essentially no
“effective mechanism to protect themselves or the company, or to discipline
corporate management.”183 The English common law on shareholder derivative
actions was “regarded as obscure, complex and inaccessible save to lawyers
specializing in this field.”184
Another commentator stated that “[t]he
circumstances in which this [derivative suit] can be done under present English
law are so obscure and difficult to establish that the derivative action is virtually
non-existent in England.”185 These criticisms helped spur the 2006 reforms of the
Companies Act.
There were, and arguably still are, many financial disincentives to
bringing a shareholder derivative suit in the United Kingdom. While the United
Kingdom does not have a contingency fee system, plaintiffs may enter into a
conditional fee agreement where an attorney can agree to a “no win, no fee”
arrangement.186 Under such agreements, the lawyer may receive up to 100% of
his or her hourly fees if the case wins.187 If the plaintiff loses, this conditional fee
arrangement is similar to U.S. contingency fees because the attorney receives
nothing. The conditional fee system, however, “compares poorly with the
contingency fees that American lawyers receive in the event of a successful
outcome.”188 Attorneys receive up to 100% of their hourly fees under U.K.
conditional fee agreements; whereas attorneys receive as much as 40% of
plaintiffs’ total monetary awards under U.S. contingency fee agreements,189 which
can exceed the attorneys’ hourly fees. The limited upside potential of U.K.
conditional fee agreements means that “a U.S.-style shareholder plaintiffs’ bar”
has not developed in the United Kingdom.190
The U.K. “loser pays” rule poses another financial disincentive to
bringing shareholder derivative lawsuits.191 If the derivative claim fails, the

180. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1404.
181. Black et al., supra note 53, at 26.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. LI, supra note 153, at 31.
185. Black et al., supra note 53, at 26.
186. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1405.
187. Id. at 1405–06.
188. Id.
189. See Brickman, supra note 48, at 706; Fitzpatrick, supra note 48, at 2045 n.9.
190. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1405.
191. Id. at 1406. For the cost structure of bringing suit in the United Kingdom, see
Civil Procedure Rules [CPR], 1998, S.I. 1998/3231, pts. 43–49 (Eng.).
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shareholder must pay the defendant’s costs unless the court grants a protectivecosts order requiring the company to reimburse the directors.192 Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Bowley193 provides an example of the high financial burden
that unsuccessful shareholders may bear under the loser pays rule. Bowley
involved an insurance company that nearly went bankrupt, and the new directors
sued the old directors to recover the losses.194 Even though the new directors
dropped the case mid-trial, the estimated legal expenses were £35 million for
Equitable Life and £10 million for the defendant directors195 (about $57 million
and $16 million in U.S. dollars).196 As an additional disincentive, even if the
shareholder is successful, a court has the discretion not to order defendants to pay
the shareholder’s legal fees.197 Further, like in the United States, any recovery in a
successful derivative action will be paid to the company and not to the shareholder
who initiated the action.198
In addition to financial disincentives, another reason shareholder
derivative lawsuits have been uncommon in the United Kingdom is the judiciary’s
reluctance to hear such cases. Prior to enactment of the current Companies Act,
the last derivative suit was the 1981 case of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Newman Indus. Ltd.199 In that case, a major institutional investor pursued
derivative litigation against two inside directors who allegedly engaged in a selfserving transaction.200 The company itself ultimately sued the directors, rendering
the derivative suit moot.201 Nevertheless, noting that the plaintiffs were
“pioneering a method of controlling companies,” the Court of Appeals stated that
the “voluntary regulation of companies is a matter for the [financial district],” and
the “compulsory regulation of companies is a matter for Parliament.”202 Thus, the
court was not willing to allow shareholders to use the judicial system as a method
of regulating companies’ conduct, stating that such regulation was a matter for the
markets and the legislature.

192. CPR, pt. 44.3(2).
193. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Bowley¸ [2003] EWHC (Comm) 263, [35]–
[41], (2004) 1 B.C.L.C. 180, 188–89.
194. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1399–1400.
195. Id. at 1407.
196. For current and historical exchange rates, see http://www.x-rates.com/cgibin/hlookup.cgi (showing that the exchange rate in the late 1990s and early 2000s was
approximately the same as current exchange rates).
197. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406.
198. Id. at 1407 n.105 (citing Spokes v. The Grosvenor & W. End Ry. Terminus Hotel
Co. Ltd., (1897) 2 Q.B. 124, 128)).
199. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. (No. 2), (1982) 1 All E.R. 354
(Ch.).
200. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406–07.
201. Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. (No. 2), (1982) 1 All E.R. 354
(Ch.).
202. Id.
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In 2006, the Companies Act statutorily altered the common law basis for
bringing a shareholder derivative suit.203 A derivative claim is defined as a
proceeding by a member of a company “in respect of a cause of action vested in
the company, and seeking relief on behalf of the company.”204 Such a claim “may
be brought only in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed
act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by
a director of the company.”205 To this extent, the Companies Act tracks U.S.
derivative law. However, it does not adopt the standing requirement of U.S. law,
which requires the shareholder to have owned shares at the time of the challenged
transaction. The U.K. law states that “[i]t is immaterial whether the cause of
action arose before or after the person seeking to bring or continue the derivative
claim became a member of the company.”206
The Companies Act also differs with respect to the U.S. demand
requirement. It requires a shareholder filing a derivative claim only to “apply to
the court for permission . . . to continue it.”207 Correspondingly, the U.K. Civil
Procedure Rules have been amended to require that a shareholder filing a
derivative claim seek permission of the court to continue and, until the court
grants permission, to prohibit the shareholder from taking any further action in the
case except to make an urgent application for interim relief.208 The Companies
Act then states that the court determines whether the shareholder’s application and
evidence constitute a prima facie case, and thus whether the case may continue.209
The court may choose to: dismiss the application; give permission to continue the
claim on limited terms; or give permission to continue the claim while also
directing the evidence to be provided by the company and adjourning the
proceedings to enable the shareholder to obtain evidence.210 Unlike U.S. law, the
Companies Act permits a shareholder to seek permission to continue a claim
originally brought by the company when that claim could be pursued
derivatively.211 It also permits a shareholder to apply to continue a claim
originally brought by another shareholder.212
In determining whether to give permission to continue a derivative claim,
the Companies Act lists specific factors that the court must consider.213 Those
203. This article discusses the provisions of the Companies Act of 2006 applicable to
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. For the provisions for derivative actions in
Scotland, which vary slightly, see Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 265 (U.K.).
204. Id. § 260(1).
205. Id. § 260(3).
206. Id. § 260(4).
207. Id. § 261(1); see also Kurt A. Goehre, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete?
How the United Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the
United States Can Learn from It, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 140, 142–43 (2010).
208. CPR 19.9.
209. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 261(2).
210. Id. § 261(3–4).
211. Id. § 262.
212. Id. § 264.
213. Id. § 263(3).
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factors include the applicant’s good faith and the company’s decision not to
pursue the claim.214 The court also must consider “the importance that a person
[with a duty to promote the company’s success] would attach to continuing [the
claim].”215 Similarly, the Companies Act requires that the court give “particular
regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the company who
have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter.”216 In addition, if the
alleged act or omission has not yet occurred, the court must consider whether the
company could, and likely would, authorize it before it occurs or ratify it after it
occurs.217 If the act or omission has already occurred, the court must consider
whether it could be, and likely would be, ratified by the company.218 Finally, the
court is directed to consider whether the claim could be pursued as a direct claim
rather than a derivative claim.219
For several of those factors, the Companies Act expressly states that
permission to continue a derivative claim “must be refused” if that factor is
satisfied.220 So, if a person with a duty to promote the company’s success “would
not seek to continue the claim,” the court must refuse permission to continue it.221
Similarly, the court must refuse permission to continue the claim if the company
has authorized or ratified the challenged act or omission.222 Thus, to receive
permission to continue the case, the shareholder essentially must establish at a
preliminary stage that the challenged conduct has not been authorized or ratified
by the company and that a director or officer would pursue the claim.223 If the
court grants leave to continue the derivative claim, a trial on the merits may
follow.224
The statutory authorization of shareholder derivative actions in the
Companies Act has produced mixed reactions. Some companies, particularly
those operating within politically sensitive areas, have expressed concern that the
new law strengthens the rights of those who acquire shares to bring derivative
actions for the purpose of harassing companies.225 In a 2006 survey of directors of
public companies, 54% said they were “very concerned” or “quite concerned” that
the new law would increase the number of claims against directors.226 However,
no wave of derivative litigation has materialized since the Act was implemented

214. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(a), (e).
215. Id. § 263(3)(b).
216. Id. § 263(4).
217. Id. § 263(3)(c).
218. Id. § 263(3)(d).
219. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(f).
220. Id. § 263(2).
221. Id. § 263(2)(a).
222. Id. § 263(2)(b), (c).
223. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1405.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting HERBERT SMITH, SURVEY RELATED
INSURANCE: SUMMARY REPORT (2006)).
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on October 1, 2007.227 One reason for the paucity of derivative litigation may be
the new statute’s failure to address the continuing financial disincentives for
shareholders to bring such lawsuits.228
Similar to U.S. law, shareholders in the United Kingdom are not limited
to shareholder derivative suits as the sole means of attempting to control directors’
behavior. Shareholders may bring direct suits when they have experienced “unfair
prejudice” by the conduct of a company’s affairs,229 which are similar to direct
suits for oppression by minority shareholders under U.S. law.230 A breach of duty
by a company’s directors perhaps could be deemed unfair prejudice, but most
unfair prejudice cases involve the improper diversion of assets or other selfserving conduct for which the customary remedy is a buy-out at fair value.231
Shareholders may also bring a suit in their own name under U.K. securities law to
recover losses caused by false or misleading disclosures for listed companies,232
which is also similar to U.S. law.233
The United Kingdom has also sought to increase shareholder power in
other ways. It limits the extent to which directors, in the company’s constitution,
may have the power to validate self-interested transactions.234 For example,
shareholders must approve payments to directors, loans to directors, and
substantial property transactions between a company and a director.235 The
Companies Act also allows the Secretary of State to find that a criminal case may
be brought against the directors, but such suits are “virtually never prosecuted.”236
Additionally, a breach of a fiduciary or statutory duty by a director is ground for
disqualification from future service as a director.237 Finally, the Companies Act
allows shareholders to remove directors by ordinary resolution at any meeting of
the company.238 One commentator concludes that these additional mechanisms
for controlling director conduct mean “that corporate governance in the United
Kingdom does not so much rely on enforcing managerial care by directors’
personal liability, but rather on the danger of removal by ordinary shareholder
resolution, and in particular as a consequence of a change of corporate control.”239
Thus, the United Kingdom has sought to strengthen shareholders’ rights through
these mechanisms as well as through the explicit recognition of shareholder
227. Goehre, supra note 207, at 156.
228. Black et al., supra note 53, at 28.
229. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 994.
230. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
231. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1409.
232. Id.
233. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); SEC Rule 10b-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
234. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 41.
235. Id. §§ 188–226; see also Nolan, supra note 166, at 427.
236. Nolan, supra note 166, at 430–31.
237. Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 6 (U.K.); see also Nolan,
supra note 166, at 432.
238. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168.
239. Hopt & Leyen, supra note 158, at 152.
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derivative actions. It will take years to assess whether these reforms truly produce
more effective corporate governance.

B. The United Kingdom Lacks a Business Judgment Rule Defense
Although the United Kingdom has never explicitly recognized a business
judgment rule defense, the 1985 version of the Companies Act contained a
provision with language loosely resembling such a defense.240 This provision
allowed a court to excuse company officials for a breach of duty if the court found
that they acted “honestly and reasonably” and “ought fairly to be excused.”241
The current Companies Act, however, does not contain a similar provision. It also
expressly states that provisions protecting directors from liability are void: “Any
provision that purports to exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any
liability that would otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence,
default, breach of duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void.”242
The current Companies Act thus does not appear to recognize any business
judgment rule defense.
Indeed, the United Kingdom does not articulate a statutory or judicially
created business judgment rule defense similar to the robust defense created by
U.S. law.243 While U.K. courts presume company officials have acted in good
faith and require the plaintiff to prove bad faith, this only partially resembles U.S.
law.244 Nevertheless, English judges have shown that they are reluctant to secondguess corporate decision-making by directors and have refrained from holding
directors liable for errors of judgment.245

C. The United Kingdom Imposes Fiduciary Duties on Directors at Common
Law and Now by Statute
The fiduciary duties of directors have both common law and statutory
bases in the United Kingdom.

240. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 727; see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at
1414.
241. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 727.
242. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 232(1).
243. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1401; Black et al., supra note 144, at 681–
82.
244. Black et al., supra note 144, at 681–82 (“In England, there is a general
assumption that persons have acted in good faith. Anyone who alleges bad faith must state
and prove this claim and do both clearly. . . . The effect of these rules is that bad faith must
be specifically pleaded, and at trial the claim of bad faith must be supported by evidence: it
is not to be assumed.”).
245. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1401; Black et al., supra note 144, at 681–
82.
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1. Fiduciary Duties Under English Common Law
At common law, United Kingdom directors owed several “core” duties to
their companies.246 These duties were developed from trust law principles “that
persons who hold assets or exercise functions in a representative capacity for the
benefit of other people act in good faith and conscientiously protect the interests
of those they represent.”247 During the early nineteenth century, the Chancery
Court extended the fiduciary duties imposed on trustees to agents, promoters, and
directors of companies.248
In summarizing the director’s common law duty of care, one court stated
that a director “undertakes the responsibility of ensuring that he or she
understands the nature of the duty a director is called upon to perform,” but noted
“[t]hat duty will vary according to the size and business of the particular company
and the experience that the director held himself or herself out to have in support
of appointment to the office.”249 In In re D’Jan of London Ltd., the court more
broadly defined a director’s duty of care as requiring both “the general
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person” in
the director’s position and “the general knowledge, skill and experience that that
director has.”250 Regardless of the exact definition, the United Kingdom’s
common law duty of care consistently emphasized context as well as director
knowledge and diligence. Although the duty of care definition is similar to U.S.
law, the United Kingdom culpability standard is negligence rather than the
Delaware gross negligence standard.251
The duty of loyalty under English common law also developed from the
law of trusts.252 It focused on a director’s obligation to act in the corporation’s
best interests and to avoid conflicts of interests with the corporation.253 Although
English courts refrained from exhaustively defining a conflict of interest, the cases
reflect that a conflict of interest exists when a financial factor may tempt a director
246. ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, DIRECTORS’ PERSONAL LIABILITY 34 (1987).
247. Id.
248. Id.; L.C.B. GOWER ET AL., GOWER’S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 572
(4th ed., 1979).
249. In re Barings plc (No. 5), [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433, 488b (“The extent of the duty,
and the question whether it has been discharged, must depend on the facts of each
particular case, including the director’s role in the management of the company.”); Black et
al., supra note 144, at 661 n.50.
250. In re D’Jan of London Ltd., [1993] BCLC 646, 648; Black et al., supra note 144,
at 662.
251. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1401.
252. Rebecca Lee, Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: “Fiduciary Duties” of Directors
Under the Revised Company Law of the PRC , 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 897, 911 (2007); PAUL L.
DAVIES ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 16–63, 557–74 (8th ed. 2008).
253. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 252, at 16–63, 557–74; Brian Cheffins, Does Law
Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 459, 469 (2001) (“With respect to a duty of loyalty, English courts obliged directors
to act in a company’s best interests and to avoid conflicts of interest.”).
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to favor that interest at the company’s expense.254 A court could find a breach of
the duty of loyalty even if the challenged transaction was fair and reasonable.255
However, under common law, companies could avoid liability by adopting
exculpatory clauses in the corporate constitution or by having shareholders ratify a
conflict-of-interest transaction.256
While there were judicially created duties of care and loyalty, some
commentators argue that there was not a common law duty of good faith; rather,
plaintiffs had to prove bad faith.257 In In Re Smith & Fawcett, the court found that
bad faith involves the director’s conscious intention to deviate from the duty to act
in the company’s best interests.258 However, a duty of good faith has long been
assumed to apply to directors once they take their appointment, because they are
fiduciaries and must display the utmost good faith toward the company in their
dealings with it or on its behalf.259 In this sense, good faith is tested on a
common-sense standard with the “court asking itself whether it is proved that the
directors have not done what they honestly believe to be right, and normally
accepting that they have unless satisfied that they have not behaved as honest men
of business might be expected to act.”260
In addition, the United Kingdom did not traditionally make a formal legal
distinction between the duties of executive and nonexecutive directors. The role
of nonexecutive directors, however, may have been judicially altered.261 In 2001,
the court in In Re Continental Assurance Co. of London plc stated that while
directors have a responsibility to oversee the company’s activities, those
responsibilities do not “require the non-executive directors to overrule the
specialist directors, like the finance director, in their specialist fields.”262 Two
years later, the court in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley held that “the
duty owed in law by a non-executive director to a company . . . does not differ
from the duty owed by an executive director but in application it may and usually
will do so.”263 The Companies Act was revised subsequent to these cases, but it
also draws no formal distinction between executive and nonexecutive directors.

254. Black et al., supra note 144, at 705.
255. Cheffins, supra note 253, at 469–70.
256. Id.; see also Nolan, supra note 166, at 424 (“English law allows a company’s
constitution to modify directors’ fiduciary obligations so that they can be waived ex ante by
the company’s board, usually provided that the interested director takes no part in that
decision and always provided that the decision is made bone fide in the best interests of the
company—something that may be hard to disprove.”).
257. Black et al., supra note 144, at 664.
258. Id.
259. GOWER, supra note 248, at 575; Black et al., supra note 144, at 663.
260. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 252, at 601.
261. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1400.
262. Id. (quoting Re Cont’l Assurance Co. of London plc, [2001] B.P.I.R. 733, 850
(Ch.)).
263. Id. at 1400 n.51 (quoting Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Bowley¸ [2003]
EWHC (Comm) 263, [35]–[41], (2004) 1 B.C.L.C. 180, 188–89).
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2. Fiduciary Duties Under the Companies Act of 2006
The Companies Act mandates that directors of U.K. companies comply
with numerous new provisions regulating directors’ conduct.264 For example,
directors must “act in accordance with the company’s constitution.”265 It also
clarified the fiduciary duties traditionally owed by directors. These U.K. fiduciary
obligations are analogous to corporate statutes in U.S. states, as discussed below.
The Companies Act requires directors to “exercise reasonable care, skill
and diligence.”266 The statute then defines this term as meaning “the care, skill
and diligence that would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with (a) the
general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a
person” in the director’s position, and “(b) the general knowledge, skill and
experience that that director has.”267 This definition incorporates almost verbatim
the definition stated by the court in In re D’Jan of London Ltd.268 It also closely
resembles the definition of the duty of care under U.S. law, including Delaware
common law and the MBCA provision adopted by a majority of U.S. states.
The Companies Act also obligates a director to “act in the way he
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the
company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”269 The director must
consider the likely long-term consequences of the decision; the interests of
employees; the business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others; the
impact on the community and the environment; the desirability of “maintaining a
reputation for high standards of business conduct”; and the need to treat members
fairly.270 This duty is subject to any law “requiring directors, in certain
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.”271
The current Companies Act states a duty of loyalty that resembles the
MBCA provisions enacted by a majority of U.S. states in that it requires directors
to act independently and disinterestedly. However, while it requires directors to
“exercise independent judgment,” it fails to offer any definition of independent
judgment.272 In section 175, the Companies Act more clearly outlines a director’s
duty to avoid both direct and indirect interests that conflict or may conflict with
the company’s interests, including the “exploitation of any property, information
or opportunity.”273 However, section 175 lessens the duty to avoid conflicts of

264. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1402. For the duties of company directors,
see Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 154–259.
265. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 171.
266. Id. § 174(1).
267. Id. § 174(2).
268. In Re D’Jan of London Ltd., [1993] BCLC 646, 648; Black et al., supra note 144,
at 662.
269. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 172(3).
272. Id. § 173.
273. Id. § 175(1), (2).
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interest by stating that the duty is not infringed if “the situation cannot reasonably
be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.”274 It also states that the
duty is not infringed if the directors have properly authorized the conflict.275
Section 176 of the Companies Act also clearly states that directors owe a duty not
to accept benefits from third parties on account of their position or actions as
directors.276 However, like section 175, it then lessens this duty by stating that it
“is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.”277
Similar to the MBCA, section 177 of the Companies Act requires a
director to declare to the other directors any direct or indirect interest in a
proposed transaction with the company “before the company enters into the
transaction.”278 The declaration must include the nature and extent of the
director’s interest,279 and it must be updated if the declaration of interest later
becomes inaccurate or incomplete.280 Although section 177 excuses a director
from declaring an interest of which the director is not aware, it states that “a
director is treated as being aware of matters of which he ought reasonably to be
aware.”281 Similar to sections 175 and 176, however, section 177 lessens this duty
by stating that a director need not declare an interest “if it cannot reasonably be
regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest” or if the “other directors are
already aware of it.”282 The Companies Act thus makes it fairly simple for
directors to avoid a breach of the duty of loyalty.
To enforce these general fiduciary duties, the Companies Act added
provisions expressly allowing civil lawsuits for breaches of these duties.283 Like
the MBCA, the Companies Act states that where a director has complied with the
duty to avoid conflicts of interest or the duty to declare any interest in a proposed
transaction by authorization of the directors, then the transaction “is not liable to
be set aside by virtue of any common law rule or equitable principle requiring the
consent or approval of the members of the company.”284 A separate chapter of the
Companies Act requires the consent or approval of the corporation’s members in
certain circumstances; compliance with the general duties does not remove the
274. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 175(4).
275. Id. § 175(4); see also id. § 175(5) (stating that a private company’s directors may
authorize a conflict where “nothing in the company’s constitution invalidates such
authorization” and that a public company’s directors may do so where the company’s
constitution enables directors to authorize the matter); id. § 175(6) (stating that the
directors’ authorization is effective only if the “director in question or any other interested
director” cannot be counted to satisfy the quorum and voting requirements).
276. Id. § 176.
277. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 176(4).
278. Id. § 177(1), (4).
279. Id. § 177(1).
280. Id. § 177(3).
281. Id. § 177(5).
282. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 177(6)(a), (b).
283. Id. § 178.
284. Id. § 180(1).
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need for such approval.285 It further states that these general duties are subject to
any rule of law enabling the company to alter the duties owed by directors.286
Unlike the statutes of U.S. states, however, the Companies Act does not allow a
company’s constitution to exempt directors from liability for breach of duty.287
U.K. shareholders may only excuse, on a case-by-case basis, a breach that does
not involve misappropriation of corporate assets or fraud.288 Because the key
provisions in the Companies Act regarding directors’ fiduciary duties and civil
remedies for breaches of those duties were fully implemented only in October
2007, there is no case law concerning derivative lawsuits under these new
provisions.

IV. CANADA
Canada has a federal legal system in which each province has authority
to determine its laws as specified in the Canadian Constitution. The federal
government enacted the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) in 1975, but
this is an optional law.289 Each province is free to enact its own corporate law,
and firms may choose to be governed by the laws of a province or the CBCA.290
Most Canadian provinces have either copied or closely imitated the CBCA in their
corporate governance laws.291
Like the United States and the United Kingdom, corporations in Canada
have a single board of directors,292 and directors are elected by the shareholders.293
Canada previously recognized shareholder derivative lawsuits at common law,
which followed the English common law rules.294 In the 1970s, Canada
experienced significant corporate law reform leading to the CBCA.295 Today,
285. Id. § 180(3).
286. Id. § 180(4).
287. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1402–03.
288. Id.
289. Black et al., supra note 144, at 631; Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1442.
290. Black et al., supra note 144, at 631; Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1442.
291. Black et al., supra note 144, at 631; Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1442.
292. Black et al., supra note 144, at 768.
293. Doing Business in Canada – Establishing a Canadian Subsidiary, INT-CONT-M
§ 49.61 (2011).
294. For an analysis of common law shareholder derivative litigation in Canada, see
William Kaplan & Bruce Elwood, The Derivative Action: A Shareholders “Bleak House”?,
36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 443, 445 (2003). For a discussion of English common law
rules on shareholder derivative actions, see supra Part III.A.
295. Poonam Puri, Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada, 2009 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1671, 1694–95 (2009). Much of the corporate law reform in the 1970s was inspired
by the recommendations of the Dickerson Report. ROBERT W.V. DICKERSON ET AL., 1
PROPOSALS FOR A NEW BUSINESS CORPORATIONS LAW FOR CANADA (1971); see also Martha
O’Brien, The Director’s Duty of Care in Tax and Corporate Law, 36 U. BRIT. COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 679 (2003).
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Canada authorizes shareholder derivative actions in the CBCA, which is described
in Section A. Section B explains that Canada recognizes a business judgment rule
defense that is more limited than that of U.S. states. Section C then discusses
Canada’s evolution of directors’ duties from common law to the current statutory
rules, which are also similar to those recognized by U.S. states.

A. Canada Statutorily Authorizes Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Similar to the U.K. Companies Act, the CBCA requires a shareholder to
apply to the court for leave to bring an action on behalf of the corporation.296 It
also permits a shareholder, upon application, to intervene in an action to which the
corporation is a party.297 For the court to grant leave for a shareholder derivative
action, the following conditions must be met: a) the shareholder gave notice to the
company fourteen days before making the application if the company did “not
bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue the action”; b) the shareholder
“is acting in good faith”; and c) the action is in the company’s interests.298 This
procedure resembles that of the U.K. Companies Act. While also similar to the
U.S. demand requirement in that the shareholder must give notice to the board,
under the CBCA, the court decides whether the action may continue.
Also, like the U.K. Companies Act, the CBCA gives the court broad
authority to make any order, at any time, in a shareholder derivative action that it
thinks fit.299 These orders may: authorize the shareholder or another person to
control the action; give directions for the action’s conduct; direct a defendant to
pay any judgment directly to former and present shareholders, instead of to the
corporation; and require the corporation to pay the shareholder’s reasonable legal
fees.300 Commentators have found that “this statutory derivative action procedure
has been sporadic, however, particularly when self-serving conduct has been
lacking and a public company has been involved.”301
Although Canada permits shareholder derivative lawsuits, several
financial disincentives may deter shareholders from bringing derivative lawsuits.
At least one of these disincentives has been alleviated. Canada historically
prohibited contingency fees by common law and statute, but such fees are now
permitted in most jurisdictions in Canada just as they are in the United States.302
296. Canada Business Corporations Act [CBCA], R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 239 (Can.),
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-44/index.html.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. § 240.
300. Id.
301. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1443.
302. Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 99, 122 (2001);
Caroline Davidson, Tort Au Canadien: A Proposal for Canadian Tort Legislation on Gross
Violations of International Human Rights & Humanitarian Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1403, 1443 (2005).
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However, various financial disincentives remain. First, any recovery in a
successful derivative action will be paid to the company just as it is in the United
States and United Kingdom.303 Second, Canada follows the English “loser pays”
rule, which requires the losing party to pay at least some of the successful party’s
legal costs.304 Thus, a shareholder who applies for leave to pursue a derivative
action and fails or who goes to trial and loses may be ordered by the court to pay
the other side’s legal costs. Even if ultimately successful, the shareholder must
initially pay the costs because courts are reluctant to order companies to pay
expenses until after final disposition.305 Third, unlike in the United States where a
settlement may provide for attorney’s fees, Canada does not authorize settlements
for payment directly from the company to the shareholders’ lawyers.306 The court
may make an order requiring the corporation to pay the legal fees incurred by a
shareholder in a derivative suit.307 The parties, however, cannot privately agree to
a settlement because court approval is required to discontinue a derivative suit,308
and the court is unlikely to approve a settlement where the company agrees to pay
fees unless the court has previously made a specific order.309
In addition, like the direct shareholder lawsuits for oppression under the
laws of the United States and those for unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom,
Canada permits shareholders to bring a direct lawsuit for relief on the grounds of
unfair prejudice.310 These suits, however, are not common for Canadian public
companies because the “equitable rights” that usually underlie a successful direct
claim are less likely to arise in a public company than a private company.311

B. Canada Recognizes Limited Defenses for Directors by Statute and at
Common Law
In 2001, Canada amended the CBCA to expressly include limited
defenses for directors. The CBCA provides that a director is not liable for an
alleged breach of the duty of care if the director has “exercised the care, diligence
and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in comparable
circumstances.”312 Although limited to the duty of care, this provision is
comparable to the business judgment rule recognized by Delaware and the MBCA
adopted by many U.S. states. The CBCA further provides that a director is not
liable for a breach of the duty of care or good faith if the director relied in good
303. Kaplan & Elwood, supra note 294, at 457.
304. Black et al., supra note 53, at 14.
305. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1444.
306. See Black et al., supra note 53, at 14.
307. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 240(d).
308. Id. § 242(2).
309. Black et al., supra note 53, at 14.
310. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 241.
311. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1444.
312. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §§ 123(4).
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faith on a) financial statements by a corporate officer or a written report of the
corporation’s auditor represented “fairly to reflect the financial condition of the
corporation,” or b) a report of a professional “whose profession lends credibility”
to it.313 This narrow provision, excusing liability for good faith reliance on the
corporation’s financial statements or reports by professionals, correlates to
provisions contained in Delaware’s statutes and the MBCA.314
While these statutory defenses amount to a limited formulation of the
business judgment rule, several Canadian courts had previously recognized a form
of judicial deference to directors’ business decisions similar to it. For example, in
duty of care cases, Canadian courts have stated that they are reluctant to find a
breach of fiduciary duty “simply because a business decision went badly
wrong.”315 In a 1998 case, Maple Leaf Foods v. Schneider Corp., the Ontario
Court of Appeals stated that it reviews whether “the directors made a reasonable
decision not a perfect decision.”316 If the decision falls “within a range of
reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that of the board
even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on the board’s
determination.”317 Similarly, in CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western
International Communications Ltd., that same court stated a deferential judicial
standard for business decisions: “[T]he court should be reluctant to substitute its
own opinion for that of the directors where the business decision was made in
reasonable and informed reliance on the advice of financial and legal advisors
appropriately retained and consulted in the circumstances.”318 Thus, even without
the statutory defense, Canadian courts commonly gave deference to directors’
business decisions when the shareholders alleged a breach of the duty of care.
To the extent these courts recognized a limited business judgment rule
defense, they did so without expressly adopting the U.S. formulation of it.319
After the CBCA was amended, however, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly
adopted a business judgment rule defense for the duty of care that closely mimics
the U.S. rule.320 In People’s Department Stores v. Wise, a bankruptcy action in
313. Id. §§ 123(4–5).
314. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e); MBCA § 8.30(e), (f).
315. See Black et al., supra note 144, at 675–77.
316. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R. 3d 177 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
317. Id.
318. CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC Western International Communications Ltd.,
[1998] 39 O.R. 3d 755 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.); O’Brien, supra note 295, at n.20.
319. Black et al., supra note 144, at 676–77 (“Canadian courts, like their English
counterparts, traditionally refrained from articulating or applying a specific business
judgment rule.”). Cf. Kenneth G. Ottenbreit & John E. Walker, Learning from the
Delaware Experience: A Comparison of the Canada Business Corporations Act and the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 29 CAN. BUS. L.J. 364, 370 (1998) (noting that
Canada, unlike Delaware, lacked a “broad base of judicial decisions” upon which to base a
business judgment rule defense).
320. See Pamela L.J. Huff & Russell C. Silbergleid, From Production Resources to
People’s Department Stores: A Similar Response by Delaware and Canadian Courts on the

608

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 28, No. 3

2011

which the directors were alleged to have breached a duty of care, the court stated a
business judgment rule type of defense:321
Courts are ill-suited and should be reluctant to second-guess the
application of business expertise to the considerations that are
involved in corporate decision making, but they are capable, on
the facts of any case, of determining whether an appropriate
degree of prudence and diligence was brought to bear in
reaching what is claimed to be a reasonable business decision at
the time it was made.322
The court noted that the risk of hindsight bias had led lower Canadian courts to
develop “a rule of deference to business decisions.”323 Thus, after Wise, directors
must “act prudently and on a reasonably informed basis,” and their decisions need
not be perfect but “must be reasonable business decisions in light of all the
circumstances about which the directors . . . knew or ought to have known.”324
The Canadian business judgment rule differs from the U.S. rule because
it applies only to cases in which the court is deciding “whether the directors have
met their duty of care, diligence, and skill.”325 It does not apply when a plaintiff is
alleging that directors breached their duty to act in the company’s best interests 326
or when a transaction involves a conflict of interest.327 In addition, the Canadian
business judgment rule differs from the U.S. rule in that Canadian courts will
analyze both the process leading to the business decision and the decision itself in
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable choice.328 If the court finds that
the decision falls within the range of reasonableness, it will not substitute its

Fiduciary Duties of Directors to Creditors of Insolvent Companies, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
455 (2007) (noting the similarity between the Canadian decision in Wise and a later U.S.
court decision).
321. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.); see also Gevurtz,
supra note 54, at 468.
322. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.).
323. Id.; see also Huff & Silbergleid, supra note 320, at 492; O’Brien, supra note 295,
at n.20 (stating that “directors’ actions are not to be judged against the perfect vision of
hindsight” and “should be measured against the facts as they existed at the time the
impugned decision was made” (citing CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC W. Int’l Commc’ns
Ltd., [1998] 39 O.R. 3d 755 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.)).
324. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.).
325. Id.; Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R.3d 177 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
326. See People’s Dep’t Stores, 3 S.C.R. 461; CW Shareholdings Inc. v. WIC W. Int’l
Commc’ns Ltd., [1998], 39 O.R. 3d 755 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.); see also Black et al., supra
note 144, at 677.
327. Black et al., supra note 144, at 677–78.
328. Id.

Imitation or Improvement?

609

opinion for that of the directors.329 Thus, this limited Canadian business judgment
rule defense replicates only the portion of the U.S. rule concerning alleged
breaches of the duty of care, for which U.S. states permit corporations to eliminate
any liability.

C. Canada Imposes Fiduciary Duties on Directors at Common Law and Now
by Statute
Directors’ fiduciary duties originated in common law cases in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As stated by the Canadian Supreme
Court, a fiduciary relationship requires “loyalty, good faith and avoidance of a
conflict of duty and self-interests.”330 Courts imposed a limited and subjective
standard of competence on directors, requiring them “to act with only the skill and
care that could be expected of the particular director, given that individual’s
knowledge and experience.”331 Under common law, directors were not liable for
errors of judgment and were not obligated to continuously pay attention to the
company’s affairs or attend directors’ meetings.
The CBCA provides the current basis for directors’ fiduciary duties.
Similar to U.S. law, the CBCA articulates a standard for the duty of care that
requires directors to “exercise the care, diligence and skill” of a “reasonably
prudent person.”332 Contrary to the objective standard recognized by U.S. law,
however, the standard articulated in the CBCA is “a reasonably prudent person in
The addition of the “in comparable
comparable circumstances.”333
circumstances” phrase has been interpreted as maintaining the common law
subjective standard of diligence, care, and skill. For example, in Neil Soper v. Her
Majesty the Queen, the Court of Appeals for Ottawa analyzed the Income Tax
Act’s section 227.1(3) requiring a director to exercise “due diligence” in
complying with tax laws, which the court found to be similar to the CBCA’s duty
of care standard.334 The court held that the duties of diligence, skill, and care
stated in the CBCA are subjective.335 It explained that the “[u]se of ‘in
comparable circumstances’ indicates that a reasonably prudent person in
comparable circumstances may be an unskilled person. The subjective element of
the common law standard of skill has not been altered by federal statute.”336

329. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., [1998] 42 O.R. 3d 177 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
330. Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O’Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592 (Can.); see also
Black et al., supra note 144, at 653.
331. O’Brien, supra note 295, at ¶ 6.
332. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 122(2).
333. Id. § 122(2)(b).
334. Soper v. Her Majesty the Queen, [1998] 1 F.C. 124 (Can. C.A.).
335. Id.
336. Id.
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The CBCA also states that directors owe a duty to “act honestly and in
good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”337 This
formulation invokes a duty of good faith similar to the MBCA’s imposition of
liability for “action not in good faith”338 and perhaps to the more limited duty
recognized by Delaware courts.339 This CBCA provision may even encompass
part of the duty of loyalty as recognized in U.S. law in that it requires directors to
act in the best interests of the corporation. Nonetheless, this language is less
specific than an articulation of a duty of loyalty that requires disinterestedness and
independence by directors in making decisions on behalf of the corporation, as
appears in U.S. law and U.K. law.
In Wise, the Supreme Court of Canada again confirmed that the fiduciary
duties imposed upon directors are subjective and that, in considering the best
interests of the corporation, directors may also consider the interests of
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments, and the
environment.340 This formulation of interests differs from that of U.S. courts,
which typically state that directors must consider only the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. Several years after Wise, the Canadian Supreme
Court made it mandatory for the board to consider the interests of all stakeholders
when making decisions for the corporation.341 It also expressly rejected the idea
that shareholders’ interests should prevail.342 Thus, directors’ statutory duties in
Canada are owed to the corporation and not to the shareholders.343
Contrary to U.S. law but similar to U.K. law, the CBCA prohibits any
exculpation of the directors’ fiduciary duties.344 It states that “no provision in a
contract, the articles, the by-laws or a resolution relieves a director or officer from
the duty to act in accordance with this Act or the regulations or relieves them from
liability for a breach thereof.”345 In 2001, however, Canada amended the CBCA
to replace joint and several liability with proportionate liability, meaning that
“every defendant or third party who has been found responsible for a financial
loss is liable to the plaintiff only for the portion of the damages that corresponds
to their degree of responsibility for the loss.”346 While not exculpating directors’
liability, proportionate liability reduces the potential liability exposure of
directors.

337. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 122(1).
338. MBCA § 8.31(a)(2)(i)–(iii) (2008).
339. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–65 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63–64 (Del. 2006).
340. People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.); see also Catherine
Francis, People’s Department Stores Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’ and
Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duties of Care, 41 CAN. BUS. L.J. 175 (2004–2005).
341. BCE v. 1967 Debenture Holders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.).
342. Id.
343. Alvi v. Misir, [2004] Carswell 5302, 57–58 (Ont.).
344. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 122(3).
345. Id.
346. Id. § 237(3); see also Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1442.
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V. AUSTRALIA
Australia’s corporate laws are established by the national government,347
and its laws followed English law for many years.348 Since 1981, Australia has
been engaged in an ongoing process of corporate law reform.349 Australia enacted
a comprehensive statutory scheme for corporate governance in 2001.350 Its
Corporations Act of 2001 has provisions that closely resemble those of the U.K.
Companies Act.351 Like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada,
Australia’s corporate law requires a single board of directors,352 and directors are
elected by shareholders.353 A national agency, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC), oversees all incorporations and is responsible
for regulating corporations, stock markets, and financial services.354 ASIC
administers Australia’s Corporations Act and can commence civil penalty
proceedings, criminal proceedings, or administrative proceedings for violations of
the statute.355 For instance, the ASIC may disqualify directors from continued
service through an administrative ban or a civil penalty proceeding.356 ASIC’s
347. See Paul von Nessen, Australian Effort to Promote Corporate Social
Responsibility: Can Disclosure Alone Suffice?, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2009). Once
a company registers under the Corporations Act of 2001, it is automatically registered as an
Australian company and can conduct business throughout Australia without the need to
register in state or territorial jurisdictions. Starting a Company, AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES &
INVESTMENTS
COMMISSION,
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/ASIC.NSF/byHeadline/
Starting%20a%20company%20or%business (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
348. Paul von Nessen, The Americanization of Australian Corporate Law, 26
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 239–40 (1999).
349. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1435.
350. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1) (Austl.).
351. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1435.
352. Elizabeth Shi, Board Structure and Board Composition in Australia and
Germany: A Comparison in the Context of Corporate Governance, 2007 MACQUARIE J.
BUS. L. 10 (2007); Peter Surgeon, Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties in
Australia, in GLOBAL COUNSEL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
HANDBOOK (2003).
353. See Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s
Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22 (2010) (noting that Australia’s
Corporations Act § 203D grants “shareholders of public companies an absolute right to
remove directors from office, with or without cause, by majority vote”).
354. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1; see also
von Nessen, supra note 348, at 249.
355. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt. 5B; see von Nessen, supra note 348, at 262–63;
Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The Gap Between Theory and
Practice, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 908, 922 (2009) (noting that the ASIC issued 17 noncriminal civil penalty applications alleging contravention of the duty of care between July
1, 2001, and June 30, 2009); id. at 932 (noting that the ASIC commenced 88 court
enforcement actions alleging contravention of directors’ duties, of which 85 were criminal
prosecutions and three were civil penalty applications).
356. Welsh, supra note 355, at 928–29 (citing Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 206).
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active role in enforcing directors’ fiduciary duties distinguishes Australia’s
corporate system from the other countries discussed in this article.357
Until 2000, Australia allowed shareholder derivative actions pursuant to
common law, which followed similarly narrow rules as U.K. common law.358 In
2001, Australia enacted explicit rules for shareholder derivative actions in its
Corporations Act. The statute empowers a shareholder (called a member in
Australia) to bring an action on behalf of the company or to intervene in any
proceeding to which the company is a party if the shareholder receives leave of
court.359 Contrary to U.S. law, Australia’s Corporations Act also permits a former
shareholder to bring a derivative action or to intervene in an action to which the
company is a party360 and gives the same authority to an officer or former officer
of the company.361 Thus, like in the United Kingdom and Canada, to bring a
shareholder derivative action or to intervene in an action to which an Australian
company is a party, the current or former shareholder must first apply for leave of
court.362
Once a derivative action is initiated, the court is required to grant the
shareholder leave to continue the case if it is satisfied that: a) the company will
not bring or take responsibility for the case; b) the shareholder is acting in good
faith; c) it is in the company’s best interests; d) “there is a serious question to be
tried”; and e) either the applicant notified the company fourteen days before
making the application or leave should be granted without such notice.363 These
preconditions for leave to continue a shareholder derivative action are virtually
identical to Canada’s statute.364 They are also similar to the U.K. Companies Act
in that granting leave requires a good faith applicant and requires the company to
have decided not to bring the lawsuit. In addition, these preconditions are similar
to the U.S. demand requirement in that the shareholder must have notified the
company or show why such notice should not be required.
Australia’s Corporations Act further creates “[a] rebuttable presumption
that granting leave is not in the best interests of the company” if certain conditions
are met.365 First, the proceedings must be by or against a third party.366 Second,
the company must have decided not to bring or defend the proceedings or have
decided to discontinue or settle the case.367 Third, all directors who participated in
the challenged decision must have: 1) “acted in good faith for a proper purpose”;
2) had no “material personal interest in the decision”; 3) “informed themselves
357. Id.
358. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1435; von Nessen, supra note 348, at 262.
359. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1).
360. Id. s 236(1)(a).
361. Id. s 236(1)(b).
362. Id. s 237(1).
363. Id. s 237(2).
364. See CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 239 (Can.).
365. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(3).
366. Id. s 237(3)(a).
367. Id. s 237(3)(b).
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about the subject matter of the decision to the extent they reasonably believed to
be appropriate”; and 4) “rationally believed that the decision was in the best
interests of the company.”368 The statute also states that a “director’s belief that
the decision was in the best interests of the company is a rational one unless the
belief is one that no reasonable person in their position would hold.”369 While
Australia’s preconditions for granting leave are nearly identical to those under
Canada’s statute, the CBCA does not include a rebuttable presumption that
granting leave is not in the best interests of the company.
This rebuttable presumption within the Australian Corporations Act,
however, resembles U.S. law in several ways. The third condition of the
rebuttable presumption is similar to that of the business judgment rule recognized
by U.S. states in that directors are presumed to have complied with their fiduciary
duties of good faith, loyalty, and care. Thus, like in the United States, the
directors must have breached one of these fiduciary duties for the presumption to
be rebutted. However, this third condition appears to place the burden on the
defendant directors to establish that they complied with their fiduciary duties,
which is a burden borne by the plaintiff shareholders in the United States. In
addition, the second condition of Australia’s rebuttable presumption vaguely
correlates to the U.S. demand requirement. The first condition, however, differs
from U.S. law. It limits Australia’s rebuttable presumption to cases by or against
a third party, which may exclude cases directly against directors. Thus, no
rebuttable presumption would apply when the shareholder brings suit against the
directors, which differs greatly from the U.S. business judgment rule that protects
directors from liability.
Australian courts historically were deferential to directors’ business
decisions, but they did not develop a U.S.-style business judgment rule defense
that presumes directors complied with their fiduciary duties.370 Australia’s
Corporations Act now recognizes a business judgment defense, which is popular
among Australian directors.371 Indeed, Australia’s business judgment defense is
identical to the third condition of the statute’s rebuttable presumption that granting
leave is not in the company’s best interests. Like U.S. law, Australia’s
Corporation Act defines “business judgment” as encompassing a decision for the
corporation to take or not to take action.372 The statute states that directors’
business judgment meets the statutory requirements and their equivalent common
law duties if four criteria are satisfied.373 First, the directors “make the judgment
in good faith for a proper purpose.”374 Second, they “do not have a material
personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment.”375 Third, they “inform
368. Id. s 237(3)(c).
369. Id. s 237(3).
370. See von Nessen, supra note 348, at 264.
371. Id.
372. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(3).
373. Id. s 180(2).
374. Id. s 180(2)(a).
375. Id. s 180(2)(b).
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themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably
believe to be appropriate.”376 This subjective standard replicates U.K. law, rather
than the objective standard of U.S. law. Fourth, they “rationally believe that the
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.”377 The statute defines the
directors’ belief as rational “unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in
their position would hold.”378 Thus, similar to U.S. law, the directors’ business
judgment is protected if they acted consistent with their duties of good faith,
loyalty, and care. Unlike U.S. law, however, Australia’s Corporations Act places
the burden on the directors to establish these four criteria, meaning the directors
must prove that they complied with their fiduciary duties.
Australia’s Corporations Act also imposes fiduciary duties on directors.
Indeed, a recurring theme of Australia’s corporate law reform has been the
creation of legal obligations for directors.379 Core fiduciary duties originally
created through case law are now contained within Australia’s Corporations
Act.380 It creates a duty of care quite similar to U.S. law, requiring directors to
“exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and
diligence that a reasonable person would exercise.”381 Similar to Canada,
however, Australia limits the reasonable person standard to “a director . . . of a
corporation in the corporation’s circumstances” and with the same responsibilities
as the director.382 Within the statement of its business judgment rule and the
rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the company’s best interests,
Australia’s Corporations Act imposes duties of good faith and loyalty that are
similar to U.S. law. It requires that directors make decisions in good faith and that
directors not have material personal interests when making decisions for the
company.383
Even though Australia’s Corporations Act allows for shareholder
derivative actions, there are numerous disincentives under Australian law for
bringing such actions. Like the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia has a
“loser pays” litigation rule.384 Further, even if ultimately successful, a shareholder
will have his or her legal fees paid only if the court orders this payment, and any
monetary recovery goes to the company.385 In addition, like the United Kingdom,
Australian law does not typically allow contingency fees for lawyers.386

376. Id. s 180(2)(c).
377. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(2)(d).
378. Id. s 180(2).
379. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1433–34.
380. Id.
381. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1).
382. Id.
383. Id. ss 180, 273(3)(c).
384. Clark, supra note 53, at 148; Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1434.
385. Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1434.
386. Paul von Nessen, Australian Shareholders Rejoice: Current Developments in
Australian Corporate Litigation, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 647, 668, 683
(2008); von Nessen, supra note 348, at 263.
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Finally, a shareholder in an Australian corporation may be able to pursue
a direct action and avoid the restrictions imposed on a derivative action.
Australia’s Corporations Act permits shareholders to pursue a direct shareholder
action on the ground of unfair prejudice,387 which is identical to the direct actions
permitted in the United Kingdom and Canada as well as similar to direct actions
for oppression under U.S. law. Thus, Australia does not limit shareholders to
pursing derivative actions. The need for direct shareholder actions, however, may
be less in Australia than in the United States because its statute imposes less
onerous burdens on shareholders pursuing derivative actions. In particular,
Australia’s Corporations Act places the burden on the defendant directors to show
that they have satisfied their fiduciary duties.388

VI. CRITICISM OF SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA
The United States originally imported the shareholder derivative device
and other aspects of its legal system from England. Like the United States,
Canada and Australia are former English colonies, and their legal systems are
rooted in English legal traditions. The most recognized and frequent uses of
shareholder derivative actions occur in the United States. By contrast, such
actions have traditionally been rare in the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia. After many years of limited recognition under common law in the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, shareholder derivative actions have now
been statutorily authorized in these countries. Despite the intense criticism of
derivative litigation in the United States, described in Section A below, these
countries have expanded the availability of shareholder derivative actions, and
their statutes are comparable in many respects to those of U.S. states. Section B
examines the influence of U.S. critics, if any, on the shareholder derivative
statutes enacted by these countries.

A. Criticism of U.S. Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Shareholder derivative litigation is frequently criticized within the United
States. State legislatures and courts have attempted to curtail shareholder
derivative litigation in numerous ways, including establishing bond requirements,
enacting permissive indemnification statutes, and imposing heightened pleading
requirements; each has “been proclaimed in turn as the death knell of the
387. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 232–235.
388. See supra notes 362–78 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for
leave to continue a derivative action and requirements for the business judgment rule).
Australia’s Corporations Act also permits a former shareholder to pursue a derivative
action. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(1)(a).
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derivative suit.”389 Likewise, scholars have argued that shareholder derivative
lawsuits are broken and need reform.390 One reform proposal suggests restricting
the filing of such suits to shareholders who own a sufficient stake in the company
to ensure effective representation of the corporation’s interests.391 Similarly,
another suggested reform proposes that fiduciary duties be imposed on lead
plaintiffs in shareholder derivative actions.392 One scholar proposes the use of an
“equity trustee,” who would serve as the shareholders’ representative and monitor
management.393
Other scholars advocate that shareholder derivative litigation should be
eliminated entirely. In publicly traded corporations, a separation exists between
ownership and control.394 Shareholders provide capital and bear the financial risk
of the enterprise, while directors control and manage the shareholders’ capital
with their expertise.395 This separation of powers results in a principal-agent
relationship in public corporations.396 Principal-agent theorists contend that a
cause of action against directors or a third party, such as a supplier in breach of a
contract, is an asset that is properly left to the directors’ expertise.397 These
scholars argue that although market mechanisms may align directors and
shareholders’ financial interests, they do little to ensure that shareholders and their
attorneys act in the interest of the corporation and all of the shareholders.398
Similarly, they assert that “a meritless [derivative] suit brought by a plaintiff
without the corporation’s best interest in mind can become a significant drain on

389. James D. Cox, Searching for Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A
Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 959 (1982) (“Like the heroine
in a Saturday matinee, the derivative suit has repeatedly appeared to be at the cliffs of
disaster.”).
390. Erickson, supra note 49, at 1830.
391. Id. at 1830–31 (“The time is coming, however, when we will have to address the
broader question of whether to draw the curtain on shareholder derivative suits altogether.
My study finds that shareholder derivative suits are broken, a conclusion that leads to two
possible—but very different—avenues for reform. If shareholder derivative suits are
duplicative of other litigation, then corporate law may not need them. If, on the other hand,
shareholder derivative suits have the potential to serve as an independent and meaningful
check on corporate misconduct, then policymakers and scholars should focus on reforming
these suits.”).
392. Amy M. Koopmann, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Duties of the Lead
Plaintiff in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895, 914–21 (2009).
393. Kelli A. Alces, The Equity Trustee, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 720–21 (2010)
(explaining that the equity trustee would be elected by the seven largest shareholders, paid
by the corporation, and would owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders).
394. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical
Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2002).
395. Id. at 1681.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. (“A major weakness of representative litigation in general is that the agent
controlling the litigation often does not have the same interests as the principal.”).
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the corporation’s and its shareholders’ resources.”399 They also argue that
shareholder derivative litigation is an ineffective mechanism for controlling
directors’ conduct.400 For these reasons, principal-agent theorists conclude that
shareholder derivative litigation should be abolished.401
Others argue that the board of directors should be abolished.402 If a
union between ownership and control occurred, then shareholders would be in
control, corporate governance would improve, and “it might be possible to restrict
or eliminate derivative lawsuits.”403 It has been argued that while the law places
accountability for corporate decisions on boards of directors, “boards cannot be
meaningfully responsible for corporate decisionmaking,” and “[m]oney spent on
pursuing litigation against corporate directors is wasted, by and large, as directors
are shielded from personal liability . . . .”404 A unification of ownership and
control, however, is unlikely to occur in public corporations or large private
corporations within the United States. Professor Lynne L. Dallas proposes instead
that corporations adopt a dual board structure; a conflicts board composed of
independent directors would monitor for conflicts, while a business review board
composed of a mix of directors would perform the other board functions.405 She
also proposes that a full-time “board ombudsman,” who is independent from the
corporation’s management, be appointed “by independent directors on the
conflicts board or unitary board” to assist them in monitoring conflicts.406
Professor Stephen Bainbridge has also advocated for the abolition of
shareholder derivative litigation. He argues that “derivative litigation appears to
have little, if any, beneficial accountability effects” but imposes “a high cost
constraint and infringement upon the board’s authority.”407 In support of
abolishing derivative litigation, Professor Bainbridge argues that “various forms
399. Koopmann, supra note 392, at 897.
400. Meese, supra note 394, at 1681–82.
401. Id.
402. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 902–03 (“The problems of corporate governance will
not be solved until ownership and control are united. . . . If corporate boards serve little
purpose and if reform proposals . . . promise scant improvement, perhaps the board of
directors should be abolished.”); see also Alces, supra note 91, at 785–86 (arguing that the
board of directors should be eliminated and its functions assigned to “the real corporate
decision makers”: the officers, investors, and other “parties in interest that are essential the
firm’s daily operations and capital structure”).
403. Dent, supra note 402, at 915.
404. Alces, supra note 91, at 784.
405. Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The
Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 93 (1997).
406. Id. at 130–31; see also Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards
of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 820 (2003) (recommending that a board include
“employee directors who have incentives to protect their stakes in the corporations and who
are able to provide diverse perspectives and information to improve the quality of board
decisionmaking”).
407. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 404.
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of market discipline” exist to hold directors accountable for their actions.408 At a
minimum, he urges courts “to discourage derivative litigation.”409 Professor
Bainbridge is also one of many scholars who oppose Delaware’s current
formulation of the business judgment rule defense,410 which is another area of
shareholder derivative litigation frequently debated by U.S. scholars.411
In addition, empirical studies of U.S. shareholder derivative litigation
have led some commentators to argue for abolition of derivative actions.
Empirical studies show that settlement rates appear to be higher in shareholder
derivative actions than other civil litigation cases and that such settlements tend to
award plaintiffs’ attorneys large legal fees.412 One empirical study also
documented the prevalence of derivative lawsuit settlements focused on general
corporate governance reforms, rather than solutions to specific allegations of

408. Id.
409. Id. (“[I]t seems unlikely that courts or legislatures will eliminate derivative
litigation any time soon. In the meanwhile, courts should use the tools at hand to
discourage derivative litigation.”).
410. Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 101; see also Brown, supra note 127, at 55 (arguing
that “the business judgment rule was not meant to apply to conflict-of-interest transactions”
and advocating that approval of a conflicted decision by a majority independent board
should “only shift to the plaintiffs the burden of showing the unfairness of the
transaction”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 336–37 (1994) (advocating for the abolition of
the business judgment rule and concluding that courts should apply the ordinary negligence
standard to review directors’ actions).
411. See Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 83–84 (“Countless cases invoke it and
countless scholars have analyzed it. Yet despite all of the attention lavished on it, the
business judgment rule remains poorly understood.”); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once
More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000) (noting that
“thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and commentary have been devoted to”
the business judgment rule); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (stating the business judgment rule is “one of
the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field”). Many commentators agree
with the courts’ burden-shifting formulation of the business judgment rule as a standard of
liability. See, e.g., Arsht, supra note 72, at 133; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
437, 444–45 (1993). Other commentators believe that this formulation simply restates the
principle that defendants are entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make
a prima facie case and advocate that the rule instead should be viewed as an abstention
doctrine. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 28, at 101; D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Business
Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 830 (2007).
412. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 48, at 60–61 (finding that in a study surveying all
shareholder suits brought from the late 1960s to 1987, that only 128 reached final
resolution and of those 65% settled); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525–26 (1991)
(finding that the general civil litigation settlement rate is 60% to 70%, but, in a small
sample of securities class actions, 100% of cases settled).
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misconduct.413 These studies provide support for the view “that many derivative
suits are strike suits in which the real winners are not corporations or their
shareholders, but attorneys.”414 Viewing the empirical evidence, one scholar
concluded that “shareholder litigation appears to be more open to abuse by
frivolous lawsuits than other fields of private litigation.”415 At a minimum, the
deterrence value of derivative suits may be lessened because so many suits end in
dismissal or settlement.416
Aside from the possibility of strike suits, some commentators argue that
shareholder derivative litigation should be severely limited for other reasons.
Professors Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein note that “even if the procedural
problems of a derivative suit are solved, it is not clear if the derivative suit is an
appropriate remedy because the benefits of the derivative remedy remain
unclear.”417 They question whether a monetary damages award “serves any
compensatory role, since many of the shareholders of the corporation at the time
recovery is administered are likely to have bought their shares at prices that
already reflected the wrong from the shareholders whose shares were devalued by
the wrong.”418
While courts in the United States have not explicitly stated that
shareholder derivative actions should be abolished, courts have frequently noted
their dislike for such actions. In Marx v. Akers, the New York Supreme Court
stated that “[b]y their very nature, shareholder derivative actions infringe upon the
managerial discretion of corporate boards.”419 For this reason, courts “have
historically been reluctant to permit shareholder derivative lawsuits,” and when
permitted, courts have restrained their power “to direct the management of a
corporation’s affairs.”420 Similarly, courts often state that directors are “bettersuited than courts to make business decisions” and defer to the directors’ decisions
even though challenged by shareholders.421
Abolishing the derivative lawsuit, however, may not solve all the burdens
imposed by frivolous and abusive shareholder litigation. Shareholders may still
413. Erickson, supra note 49, at 1823 (finding that derivative lawsuits are
disproportionately filed against large public companies, are expensive for corporations, and
do not benefit the corporations based on a study showing that almost 70% of suits are
dismissed and nearly all of the remaining 30% settle).
414. See Romano, supra note 49, at 61; see also Alexander, supra note 412, at 525–
26; Erickson, supra note 49, at 1756.
415. Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suite: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit
and the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 368 (1994).
416. Id. at 1826–27.
417. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (1990).
418. Id. at 55.
419. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996) (citing Gordon v. Elliman,
119 N.E.2d 331, 335 (N.Y. 1954)).
420. Id.
421. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also
Branson, supra note 66, at 637; Costa, supra note 74, at 46.
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file direct shareholder lawsuits asserting injuries in their individual capacities,
rather than to the corporation as a whole.422 Using a direct lawsuit, “[a] skillful
plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney may find various ways to attack the corporate
officials’ alleged wrongdoing.”423 Nevertheless, shareholders’ claims would be
limited without the ability to proceed derivatively, because not all derivative
claims can be creatively pled as direct claims involving individual injuries.

B. U.S. Critics’ Influence on the Shareholder Derivative Statutes Enacted by
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia
If shareholder derivative litigation were universally disfavored, one
would expect countries to be abandoning such litigation through legislative
enactments or judicial rulings, particularly other common law countries such as
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The true state of affairs, however, is
quite different; the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have recently enacted
statutes expressly authorizing shareholder derivative lawsuits on broader grounds
than permitted at common law. Critics calling for the abolition of U.S.
shareholder derivative litigation thus did not deter these countries from expanding
the availability of shareholder derivative actions.
Yet the United States potentially influenced these countries in other
ways. For instance, a majority of U.S. states have codified shareholders’ right to
file derivative actions through adoption of the MBCA, and this same trend toward
codification can be seen in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These
countries’ statutory enactments authorizing shareholder derivative litigation even
partially resemble the MBCA provisions adopted by many U.S. states. However,
they did not imitate the exact statutory language of U.S. states, which leads to
several questions. Why did the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia choose to
statutorily authorize shareholder derivative actions? Have these countries’
statutory enactments been influenced by U.S. critics’ call for limitations on
derivative actions? Further, do these countries’ statutes offer improvements for
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States?
The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have adopted statutory
schemes that authorize shareholder derivative lawsuits and that articulate the
procedures and arguably the liability standards for such actions.424 One obvious
motivation for such statutes is to allow shareholders a means of redress for
wrongdoing by corporate management. These countries may also be attempting to
improve overall corporate governance by increasing shareholders’ incentives to
422. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362–64.
423. Brandi, supra note 415, at 400. A shareholder may file a direct action if the
cause of action belongs to the shareholder individually; for example, in claims involving
oppression of minority shareholders. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 16, at 362–63.
424. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 260–263, 171–180 (U.K.); CBCA, R.S.C. 1985,
c. C-44, §§ 239–240, 122–123 (Can.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 236–239, 180
(Austl.).
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oversee the activities of management. Similarly, because these statutes increase
the possibility that directors can be held liable for misconduct, such as a breach of
fiduciary duty, directors’ awareness of that potential liability may improve
corporate governance. To the extent that these countries were motivated to adopt
their statutes for these objectives, one could argue that they were imitating, or at
least replicating, the same often-recognized goals of U.S. shareholder derivative
law.425 More broadly, these countries may have statutorily authorized shareholder
derivative actions in an effort to increase investors’ confidence and to strengthen
their ability to compete for capital within the competitive global economy. For
instance, these countries may be seeking to better compete with U.S. corporations
in which shareholders have the right to pursue such actions. Likewise, they might
have specifically enacted such statutes to better compete for U.S. investors, who
are familiar with the shareholder derivative action. If either of these scenarios
were the motivation for these countries’ statutes, they were purposefully imitating
U.S. shareholder derivative litigation to attract investors.
It is unknown whether these new statutory schemes will increase the
number of shareholder derivative actions filed and whether these statutes will
ultimately improve shareholder oversight or director behavior. Since the current
Companies Act was implemented, the United Kingdom has not experienced a
dramatic increase in the number of shareholder derivative actions filed. Neither
have Canada or Australia. However, all three countries have well-functioning
judicial systems capable of effectively resolving shareholder derivative actions
and providing remedies. More important, these countries’ statutes have resolved
the ambiguity that existed under common law about the availability and the
requirements for pursuing a shareholder derivative action.
Setting aside the intent and ultimate success of these statutes, U.S. critics
may have influenced the particular shareholder derivative statutes enacted by the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. As already shown, these countries’
statutes replicate only certain aspects of the MBCA adopted by many U.S. states
and of Delaware law,426 so the limitations suggested by U.S. critics might have
been carefully considered by these countries. For instance, these countries may
have adopted provisions to deter the filing of weak or meritless lawsuits that harm
the corporation by imposing costs that far exceed the benefits of such litigation to
the corporation and its shareholders. If so, U.S. critics may have influenced these
countries to adopt provisions that improve the shareholder derivative device.427 In
turn, the statutory provisions adopted by these countries may offer solutions for
reforming or improving the deficiencies perceived by critics of shareholder
derivative litigation in the United States.

425. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 365–66.
426. See supra Parts III.A & C, IV.A & C, & V.
427. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 510–11 (1987) (arguing that “there are
benefits to those devices that reduce frivolous shareholder litigation”).
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Many of the criticisms against U.S. shareholder derivative actions
address the possibility of strike suits,428 which can be described as suits filed by
plaintiffs’ attorneys solely or primarily for the purpose of obtaining fees, as
opposed to achieving value for the corporation and its shareholders.429 Some U.S.
states have attempted to curb strike suits through the financial disincentive of
bond requirements, while other states rely primarily on pleading requirements and
the presumption of the business judgment rule defense to deter such suits.430 The
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have a much more potent financial
disincentive: the loser pays rule.431 Given the typically high costs of litigating
shareholder derivative actions, the potential financial burden of paying the
opponent’s costs and attorneys’ fees is a significant disincentive to filing such
actions. Although courts can relieve unsuccessful plaintiffs of the obligation to
pay their opponents’ costs,432 plaintiffs and their attorneys do not know if a court
will do so until after the litigation ends. For this reason, these countries have less
need to enact statutory provisions addressing strike suits. If U.S. legislatures were
to adopt a loser pays rule for shareholder derivative litigation, it may prove to be
an effective deterrent against strike suits. However, passage of such legislation
may be difficult given the strength of the plaintiffs’ bar and institutional
shareholders in the United States.
Another financial disincentive for filing shareholder derivative actions
exists in Australia: the prohibition against contingency fees. This financial
disincentive exists to a lesser degree in the United Kingdom, which permits only
conditional fee agreements. In the United States, and in most jurisdictions in

428. Id. (“But, regardless of one’s view on the overall desirability of shareholder
derivative suits, there is general agreement that at least some fraction of such suits are
‘strike’ suits, brought only to enrich plaintiffs’ attorneys.”); Richard W. Duesenberg, The
Business Judgement Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View from the Inside, 60
WASH. U.L.Q. 311, 331–33 (1982) (arguing that “[f]iling lawsuits with little or no merit has
become, it seems, a way of life with many lawyers”). But see Robert B. Thompson &
Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1747, 1749–50 (2004) (arguing that most derivative suits are not strike suits).
429. For example, some strike suits may be brought to force a settlement that
generates large fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys, but little to no value for the corporation and its
shareholders. See Romano, supra note 49, at 65 (arguing that attorneys are the primary
beneficiaries of derivative suits); Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from
Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 351 (2001) (“Shareholders seldom profit—suits are filed
because their attorneys stand to reap substantial fees.”); see also Hurt, supra note 46, at
381–82 (explaining that plaintiffs’ attorneys hired on a contingency fee basis are in the
driver’s seat in derivative actions because of shareholders’ collective action problem).
430. See Cox, supra note 389, at 959; see also supra note 44 (listing states with bond
requirements); supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text (discussing protection of
directors’ decisions provided by the business judgment rule).
431. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406 (United Kingdom); Black et al.,
supra note 53, at 14 (Canada); Clark, supra note 53, at 148 (Australia).
432. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 1406 (United Kingdom); Black et al.,
supra note 53, at 14 (Canada); Clark, supra note 53, at 148 (Australia).
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Canada, contingent fee agreements offer plaintiffs’ attorneys a strong incentive to
accept shareholder derivative actions even if the claims are weak.433 Under a
typical U.S. contingent fee agreement, the plaintiffs’ attorneys will receive as
much as 40% of the plaintiffs’ recovery.434 The plaintiffs’ attorney may receive a
windfall if the plaintiffs succeed because their actual fees are likely to be lower
than the contingency fee, as most derivative cases settle.435 If the plaintiff loses,
however, the plaintiff’s attorney must bear the costs with no reimbursement from
the plaintiff.436 By contrast, Australia does not permit contingency fees, which
means the plaintiff must pay the attorney during the litigation and will likely not
be reimbursed if unsuccessful.437 The Australian statute thus does not need to
counteract the incentives to file derivative actions that are created by contingency
fees. Although the United Kingdom permits conditional fee agreements, such
agreements do not offer plaintiffs’ attorneys the same incentive to pursue
shareholder derivative actions.438 Under a conditional fee agreement, the attorney
will recover only the amount of his fees if successful and must bear all the costs if
unsuccessful.439
Contingency fees play an important role in strike suits filed in the United
States and essentially make the plaintiffs’ attorney the real party in interest in
derivative litigation.440 If the United States were to follow Australia’s example
and prohibit contingency fees, plaintiffs’ attorneys may be financially deterred
from filing strike suits. However, legislatures are unlikely to prohibit contingency
433. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 382; Say H. Goo & Rolf H. Weber, The Expropriation
Game: Minority Shareholders’ Protection, 33 HONG KONG L.J. 71, 94 (2003) (“In the
United States, while the contingency fee system has made it possible for attorneys who are
willing to fund the litigation to help solve the collective action problem, it has also
encouraged attorneys to bring ‘strike suits’ only for the fees.”); Larry E. Ribstein,
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1431, 1472–73 (2006) (“The plaintiff is a nominal holder while the real party at interest is
the lawyer who stands to receive a contingency fee by winning or (more often) settling the
case. . . . For example, the attorney . . . may bring a strike suit solely to provoke a strategic
settlement . . . .”).
434. See Brickman, supra note 48, at 706; Fitzpatrick, supra note 48, at 2045 n.9.
435. See Goo & Weber, supra note 433, at 94; Ribstein, supra note 433, at 1472–73
(“The plaintiff is a nominal holder while the real party at interest is the lawyer who stands
to receive a contingency fee by winning or (more often) settling the case.”).
436. See Kon Sik Kim, The Demand on Directors Requirement and the Business
Judgment Rule in the Shareholder Derivative Suit: An Alternative Framework, 6 J. CORP.
L. 511, 521 n.56 (1981) (“Moreover, because an attorney usually serves in derivative
actions on a contingency fee basis and is therefore unlikely to be paid unless the suit is
successful or favorably settled, he will carefully weigh the merits of the suit before
undertaking it.”).
437. See von Nessen, supra note 386, at 668, 683.
438. See Cheffins & Black, supra note 53, at 405.
439. See id.
440. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 381–82; see also Ribstein, supra note 433, at 1472–73
(“The plaintiff is a nominal holder while the real party at interest is the lawyer who stands
to receive a contingency fee by winning or (more often) settling the case.”).
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fees only for shareholder derivative lawsuits, particularly since the possibility of
strike suits exists in all types of cases. In addition, institutional investors would
likely lobby against such a prohibition, arguing that it harms shareholders, reduces
management’s accountability, and may lead to corporate mismanagement.
Legislatures are also unlikely to prohibit contingency fees in all cases because that
would potentially harm plaintiffs in other types of cases, such as personal injury
and employment cases. In addition, as with the loser pays rule, the strong
plaintiffs’ bar would likely make passage of legislation barring all contingency
fees difficult. Further, various employee, labor, and victims’ rights organizations
may join plaintiffs’ attorneys in lobbying against a prohibition on contingency
fees in all cases.
Despite the existing financial disincentives, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and Australia enacted provisions requiring shareholders to seek the
court’s permission to pursue derivative litigation.441 One could argue that this
requirement addresses the strike suit problem identified by U.S. critics because at
the very beginning of a derivative suit, the court must make a determination that
the case satisfies statutorily specified criteria and thus is worthy of proceeding.
To some extent, these statutory provisions requiring leave of court to pursue
derivative actions parallel the U.S. demand requirement, which requires courts to
consider whether demand was wrongfully rejected by the board or, in some states,
whether demand should be waived. Further, these statutory provisions may
function similar to the U.S. business judgment rule, but at a slightly earlier stage
in the proceedings. For these reasons, these countries’ statutory provisions
requiring leave of court to pursue shareholder derivative actions may not
meaningfully differ from the court determinations required by U.S. law.
In addition, these countries’ leave of court statutory provisions may not
deter, and may even encourage, the filing of shareholder derivative lawsuits. The
criteria stated in the U.K.’s Companies Act, Canada’s CBCA, and Australia’s
Corporations Act make the leave of court determination a fact-based inquiry into
whether the applicant is acting in good faith.442 The U.K.’s Companies Act also
requires the court essentially to consider the importance that a director or officer
would attach to continuing the case, which is another fact-based inquiry.443
Similarly, the CBCA requires the court to consider whether the action is in the
company’s best interests.444 Like the CBCA, Australia’s Corporations Act
requires the court to consider whether the action is in the company’s best interests,
but it also creates a rebuttable presumption that granting leave is not in the
company’s best interests if certain conditions are met.445 One of those conditions
requires the court to ascertain whether the directors have satisfied their fiduciary
441. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 261–263 (U.K.); CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44,
§§ 239–240 (Can.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 236–237 (Austl.).
442. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(a) (U.K.); CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, §
239(b) (Can.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(2)(b) (Austl.).
443. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 263(3)(b) (U.K.).
444. CBCA, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, § 239(c) (Can.).
445. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 237(2)(c), (3) (Austl.).
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duties of good faith, loyalty, and care.446 These fact-intensive inquiries give
courts a great deal of discretion, which leads to unpredictability and thus may
encourage attorneys to take the chance that a shareholder derivative lawsuit will
be granted leave to continue.
U.S. critics of shareholder derivative litigation may believe that courts
will use this discretion to prevent derivative actions from continuing, but the
discretion could just as often be used to allow such cases to continue. Thus, even
if U.S. states were to adopt similar statutory provisions expressly requiring
shareholders to seek court permission to pursue derivative actions, it is difficult to
predict with certainty how courts would generally exercise that discretion. For
this reason, these statutory provisions cannot be hastily deemed to prevent or deter
strike suits. Based on the long history of U.S. courts’ deference to directors’
business decisions under the current formulations of the business judgment rule,
some may argue that courts would stop more derivative actions from continuing if
given the explicit power to determine whether to grant leave for such actions.
However, if a new statutory provision were enacted requiring courts to consider
specific criteria before granting permission to continue derivative actions, then
U.S. courts may interpret it as requiring a new level of scrutiny that differs from
that historical deference. In the end, U.S. critics of derivative actions are unlikely
to view such statutory provisions as an improvement of U.S. law, because
shareholders can still second-guess directors’ decisions by filing derivative
lawsuits and force directors to defend their actions in arguing that the court should
not grant leave to continue the lawsuits.
In addition, these countries’ statutory provisions requiring shareholders
to seek permission to pursue derivative actions vary from U.S. law in ways that
may deter U.S. critics from advocating for their adoption in U.S. states. The
United Kingdom permits shareholders to pursue derivative actions for conduct
that occurred before the shareholder acquired his or her shares, and Australia
permits former shareholders to pursue derivative actions.447 Both of these
provisions would likely exacerbate the perceived strike suits problem if adopted
by U.S. states. They may also strengthen Professors Butler and Ribstein’s
argument that monetary damages do not serve a compensatory role.448 For
instance, when shareholders bring suit for conduct occurring before they acquired
their shares, presumably the price they paid had already been reduced by the
wrongful conduct. Interestingly, despite broadening the possible shareholder
plaintiffs, these countries did not adopt any ownership stake requirement or
impose fiduciary duties on such plaintiffs as advocated by U.S. critics. These
countries also did not adopt provisions specifically designed to deal with the
conflicts of interest among shareholders, or those between shareholders and
plaintiffs’ attorneys.449
446. Id. s 237(3)(c).
447. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 260(4) (U.K.); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
s 236(1)(a) (Austl.).
448. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 417, at 54.
449. Hurt, supra note 46, at 382.
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Additional aspects of Australian law would likely prove troubling to U.S.
critics if adopted in the United States. Australia places the burden on directors to
show that they satisfied their duties of good faith, loyalty, and care when the court
determines whether the lawsuit is in the best interests of the company.450 U.S.
critics who think that shareholder derivative litigation already interferes with
corporate management are likely to find Australia’s statute even more problematic
in this regard. Australia’s corporate governance statutes are also unique in that a
government agency is given the authority to enforce directors’ fiduciary duties.451
Critics of U.S. shareholder derivative litigation are unlikely to embrace a similar
proposal in the United States, unless perhaps the government agency supplanted
shareholders’ right to bring derivative litigation, although they would likely find a
government regulator problematic as well. If both shareholders and a government
regulator could bring lawsuits alleging directors breached their fiduciary duties,
U.S. corporations would have reason to fear that a shareholder derivative lawsuit
would be filed after each action initiated by the regulator based on the example of
U.S. securities law. Soon after the SEC begins actions to enforce U.S. securities
laws and regulations, shareholder derivative lawsuits that challenge essentially the
same conduct are often filed.452 In any event, a unified federal regulator of all
U.S. corporations is unlikely because corporations have historically been created
and governed by state law.453 However, this history perhaps could be overcome in
the case of publicly listed corporations, which are already governed extensively by
federal securities laws.454
Ultimately, the frequency and success of shareholder derivative actions is
impacted by a number of factors that may vary among countries. For instance, the
views of the judiciary and plaintiffs’ attorneys of shareholder derivative actions
may affect the number and type of actions that are filed. Similarly, the availability
of contingency fee agreements will impact those issues. Shareholders’ opinions
about their role in corporate governance or about litigation generally may increase
or decrease the number of derivative actions filed. This article’s comparative
450. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(3)(c) (Austl.).
451. See von Nessen, supra note 348, at 249; Welsh, supra note 355, at 922, 932.
452. See Hurt, supra note 46, at 365–66; see also Proxy Statements and Proxies Under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities Filings 2006, 1567 PLI/Corp 99, at
150 (2006) (noting that shareholder derivative lawsuits “ha[ve] naturally followed” SEC
enforcement actions “against such industry leaders as Tyson Foods, Inc., The Walt Disney
Company, and General Electric Company”); Michael D. Torpey et al., Defending Securities
Claims, in ALI-ABA COURSE STUDY – SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES
691 (2008) (stating that “derivative actions usually still follow SEC enforcement and
private securities class actions” within discussion of the interplay of securities class actions,
derivative actions, SEC investigations, and criminal litigation).
453. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 16, at 5.
454. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003) (noting that
federal securities laws impose more stringent requirements on public companies than state
laws).
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analysis suggests that shareholder derivative litigation is not dying anytime soon.
It also demonstrates that the statutory and judicial interpretations of such litigation
in the United States can influence other countries. Legislatures, courts, and critics
in the United States would be wise to learn from other countries’ statutory
enactments and judicial interpretations regarding shareholder derivative litigation.

VII. CONCLUSION
The recent statutory enactments in the United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia resemble certain aspects of U.S. shareholder derivative law, and
therefore suggest that such actions will have continuing viability in the United
States despite being intensely criticized by U.S. scholars. These statutes also
suggest that shareholder derivative litigation has become a means by which
countries seek to attract investors, whether through a perception of improved
corporate governance by authorizing such actions or through simple imitation of
the availability of such actions in the United States. However, investors familiar
with U.S. shareholder derivative litigation should not assume that these countries’
statutory enactments are replicating U.S.-style derivative litigation. Nor should
investors assume that the expanded authorization of such litigation will
necessarily improve corporate governance.
As shareholder derivative litigation spreads around the globe, U.S. critics
urging its abolition have been largely ignored. Yet, the United States appears to
have partially influenced the shareholder derivative statutes enacted by the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and may well have been the competitive
motivation for the adoption of such statutes. Rather than calling for the abolition
of shareholder derivative litigation, U.S. critics must focus on reforming the
perceived deficiencies of such litigation. By focusing on improvements, the
United States can influence other countries as they develop and revise shareholder
derivative procedures and standards. In turn, other countries’ statutory and
judicial developments may offer improvements for U.S. shareholder derivative
litigation. With the global expansion of shareholder derivative litigation, U.S.
critics must broaden their focus beyond the United States’ experience with such
actions.
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